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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about ‘safe spaces’, understood as rule-governed spaces within 
universities which exclude certain kinds of (putatively) oppressive speech. My central 
aim is to defend safe space practice against two popular criticisms, namely what I call 
the ‘oversensitivity’ criticism, and the ‘epistemic’ criticism. In the introduction, I 
provide some motivation for the specific conception of safe spaces I employ, and 
outline the two criticisms of safe spaces, both of which seem to appeal to a certain 
conception of universities, and the values and dispositions they should inculcate in 
students. In the first chapter, I reconstruct and respond to the oversensitivity critique 
of safe spaces, which holds that safe spaces exclude certain kinds of putatively 
oppressive speech on the basis that they cause offence to target groups, and that as 
such safe spaces encourage oversensitivity, understood as a disposition to take offence 
where this is inappropriate. In the second chapter, I reconstruct and respond to the 
epistemic critique of safe spaces, which holds that the acquisition of truth and 
knowledge is best facilitated by what I call norms of open discussion, and that safe 
spaces flout such norms by excluding certain viewpoints. In my conclusion, I briefly 
outline further issues with safe spaces that I do not have space to address.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Safe spaces’ are often criticised for stifling debate, breeding a generation of coddled 
narcissists, and exchanging truth for comfort.1 It has even been suggested by some 
commentators that a perceived ‘safe space culture’ bears not insignificant 
responsibility for the Brexit result and Donald Trump’s presidential election, and 
Theresa May has recently implied that safe spaces in universities pose a threat to 
Britain’s social and economic success (Chater 2016, Hooton 2016, Mason 2016). The 
precise target of much of the criticism of safe spaces is often unclear, for the term is 
frequently conflated with various practices and tactics of leftist student activism (often 
caricatures or selective presentations), as well as being closely associated with ‘political 
correctness’ and online and offline ‘echo chambers’. This not only makes it difficult 
to assess such criticisms, but obscures what exactly safe spaces are, enabling a broader 
narrative that both scapegoats student activists as the cause of various social ills, and 
leaves unchallenged the structures they are attempting to resist (Ahmed 2015). My aim 
in this thesis is not so much to vindicate safe spaces in all their manifestations, but to 
identify a defensible core to safe space practice by providing an understanding of what 
safe spaces are, and providing responses to two popular criticisms of safe spaces.  
I begin in this introduction by clarifying what safe spaces are, before introducing 
the two criticisms I will explore in the main chapters of the thesis. In the first chapter, 
I will attempt to reconstruct and respond to what I will call the ‘oversensitivity critique’ 
of safe spaces. In the second chapter, I will attempt to reconstruct and respond to 
what I will call the ‘epistemic critique’ of safe spaces. In the concluding chapter, I will 
summarise my main arguments, and highlight some further issues with safe space 
practices that I do not have space to address.   
This introductory chapter will proceed as follows. In §1, I provide a brief 
overview of the uses of the term ‘safe space’, and identify the relevant conception of 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Lukianoff & Haidt (2015), Hughes (2016). 
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safe spaces for the purposes of this thesis, namely spaces within universities where 
certain kinds of (putatively) oppressive speech are excluded from expression. I will 
also attempt to distinguish safe spaces from other spaces which restrict what we might 
call oppressive speech. In §2, I attempt to identify what it is that critics tend to find 
problematic about safe spaces. First, I explore certain issues that critics seem to have 
with ‘safe space culture’, and ultimately suggest that the two central criticisms of safe 
spaces are (i) that safe spaces encourage oversensitivity amongst students, and (ii) that 
safe spaces flout knowledge-conducive open discussion norms. I argue that these 
concerns gain their particular force in light of a certain conception of the university, 
and the kinds of dispositions they should inculcate and values they should instil in 
students. I suggest that the oversensitivity safe spaces encourage is bad because it 
encourages a disposition that ill-prepares students for public life, where universities 
should rather encourage dispositions that prepare students for public life; and that 
flouting knowledge-conducive open discussion norms is bad, insofar as students 
should value truth-seeking, and practices within the university should not undermine 
the pursuit of knowledge, given the nature of the university as a space dedicated to 
such a pursuit. I will also provide a brief outline of my arguments in my two main 
chapters which deal with the first ‘oversensitivity’ critique and second ‘epistemic 
critique’ respectively. 
 
 
§ 1. Safe spaces 
The term ‘safe space’ has historically been used to refer to spaces of resistance to 
dominant social and political norms and practices that function to oppress certain 
groups. The initial use of the term is often traced back to 1960s America, where it was 
used to describe gay and lesbian bars as spaces where queer people could find 
community and opportunities for self-expression in a context of often violent social 
and political repression. It was also utilised in the Women’s Liberation movement to 
describe women-only consciousness-raising groups: spaces of trust where women 
were encouraged to share their experiences and perspectives away from male 
judgment and without men dominating the conversation, in order to uncover the 
obscured political roots of seemingly merely personal issues such as rape and sexual 
harassment (Kenney 2001: 23-25). Such exclusive ‘safe spaces’ continue to be used in 
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feminist organising for similar reasons, and more specific exclusive spaces such as 
women-of-colour-only spaces and queer-women-only spaces are also used due to 
concerns that power relations between different groups of women are likely to be 
reproduced within more general women-only spaces. 
The most common contemporary usage of the term ‘safe space’, however, refers 
to certain spaces within universities, and most ‘safe space’ criticism is directed at 
practices within the university context. In this context, the term ‘safe space’ is 
generally used to refer to two kinds of spaces: (i) spaces that are exclusive to certain 
marginalised groups; (ii) discussion spaces where there are explicit rules in place that 
prohibit ‘oppressive speech’. 2 , 3  The first kind of safe space are spaces where 
marginalised groups are able to express themselves without fear or negative judgment, 
insofar as they are surrounded by like-minded people or those who share their 
experiences. Such spaces bear obvious similarities to consciousness-raising safe spaces 
described above, although they need not have explicit political aims. For instance, an 
example of (i) might be a Facebook group created by students of colour for students 
of colour on an English Literature course, the purpose of which could be to organise 
a campaign for a more diverse syllabus, or simply to function as a space where 
participants can discuss course-related issues they are facing, and feel less isolated in 
their experiences. Other examples of (i) might include a social event for LGBT+ 
students organised by the union, or a Women’s Network annual general meeting. 
Although some criticisms of safe spaces focus on issues of segregated spaces in 
universities, and are thus clearly directed at the first kind of safe space, 4  most 
mainstream criticism of safe spaces is centred on the issue of suppressing certain kinds 
of expression in university spaces. As such, I will leave aside (i) and focus specifically 
on (ii).5 This second kind of safe space typically operates with a ‘safe space policy’—
                                                          
2 These two kinds of ‘safe spaces’ can exist outside the university context, but it is their occurrence 
in universities that is taken to be particularly problematic by critics.  
3 Student unions may also have policies in place that prevent certain groups from organising on 
campus, or prevent certain content being aired on campus, which are sometimes framed in terms 
of creating a ‘safe space’ on campus. For instance, UCLU has passed motions preventing fascist 
groups from organising on campus, and a number of student unions in the UK passed motions 
to ban the song ‘Blurred Lines’ in university spaces, and remove The Sun from union shops due 
to misogynistic content. Although the term ‘safe space’ is used in connection with these policies, 
I take ‘safe spaces’ to centrally refer to (i) and (ii). 
4 See e.g. Deruy (2016), Furedi (2016).  
5 Henceforth, I will use ‘safe space’ to refer to (ii).   
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a set of rules governing communication that are most often, if not exclusively, used 
in activist discussion spaces, e.g. discussion groups run by the union feminist society, 
or in student union campaign meetings.6 I take it these rules have the double role of 
ensuring that the space is relatively free from the oppressive treatment marginalised 
groups face elsewhere, and enabling marginalised groups to feel comfortable to 
express themselves. The content of specific safe space policies varies, but they tend 
to centrally include rules that ‘oppressive’, ‘discriminatory’ or ‘hateful’ speech is not 
tolerated. These are of course normatively loaded notions, with little consensus on 
just what sorts of speech really are oppressive, discriminatory or hateful. Thus it is 
unclear how precisely to characterise, from a normatively neutral perspective, the 
speech that is excluded from safe spaces, and I will return to this issue in more detail 
in the main chapters. For now, I turn to some examples of safe space policies, before 
providing a rough characterisation of the speech that is supposed to be excluded in 
safe spaces, and clarifying some of the motivations behind safe spaces.  
The following excerpt is from the Edinburgh University Feminist Society 
Constitution’s Safe Space Policy, which states that: 
 
“Members of the society are expected to conduct themselves in an orderly manner, 
and respect the right of all society members to enjoy Edinburgh University 
Feminist Society as a safe space environment, defined as a space which is 
welcoming and safe and includes the prohibition of discriminatory language and 
actions. Edinburgh University Feminist Society operates a Zero Tolerance policy 
towards discrimination based on a person’s: i. Gender Identity ii. Age iii. Race iv. 
Skin Colour v. Nationality vi. Religious Beliefs vii. Socio-Economic Background 
viii. Ability ix. HIV Status x. Sexual Orientation xi. Family Situation xii. Domestic 
Responsibilities xiii. Occupation xiv. Sex Worker Status xv. Body-
shaming/policing including but not limited to fat-shaming. 
 
The policy goes on: 
                                                          
6 Safe spaces of the second kind need not operate with a ‘safe space policy’, as long as the 
relevant rules are enforced in the space, such that the space effectively has a safe space policy.  
 
15 
 
Where a member violates these guidelines, the committee and/or Welfare and 
Accessibility Officer(s) shall have the right to deny access to the society’s physical 
and online spaces to the offending member, either for a prescribed period of time 
or indefinitely […] [E]veryone has an equal right to be heard & an equal 
responsibility to listen; and everyone has a responsibility to challenge prejudice & 
oppression. We prioritize people who have experienced oppression and provide 
them with a space in which their voices can be heard and feel safe. […] Do not 
tone police other members of the society, it is not productive to arguments and 
often creates an abusive environment.”7 
Similarly, the Goldsmiths Students’ Union Safe Space Policy states that: 
 
Goldsmiths Students’ Union (GSU) recognises that systematic oppression excludes 
certain groups whilst providing others with unequal power. The safe space policy 
is designed to protect oppressed groups and enable their full participation in the 
student union. GSU is committed to operating as a space which is inclusive and 
supportive in which no forms of discrimination are tolerated. Racism, homophobia, 
biphobia, sexism, transphobia, [ableism] or prejudice based on age, ethnicity, 
nationality, class, gender, gender presentation, language ability, immigration status 
or religious affiliation is unacceptable and will be challenged. […] Be prepared to 
challenge hateful, discriminatory, or oppressive language. If you are challenged, do 
not become defensive, but listen and think and learn. […] GSU recognises 
discrimination can occur wherever it is not consciously challenged. Upholding this 
policy is a collective responsibility and people should be confident in challenging 
any behaviour which contravenes this policy.”8,9 
 
                                                          
7 Edinburgh University Feminists website (contains link to FemSoc constitution, and safe space 
policy): https://edunifeminists.wordpress.com/  
8 Goldsmiths Students’ Union Safe Space Policy 
https://www.goldsmithssu.org/pageassets/yourunion/governance/policies/Safe-Space-
Policy.pdf  
9 See also: Manchester Students’ Union Safe Space Policy https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/nusdigital/document/documents/17915/2474048df1f844083a5a1a91da3dc
5bd/Safe%20Space%20Policy%20ws.pdf; University of Birmingham LGBTQ Association Safe 
Space Policy http://students.guild.bham.ac.uk/lgbtq/wp-content/uploads/University-of-
Birmingham-LGBTQ-Association-Safe-Space-Policy.pdf  
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Safe space policies characterise the kinds of expression that are not to be tolerated in 
safe spaces differently, but most state that it is ‘discriminatory’, ‘hateful’, or ‘oppressive’ 
language, or the expression of prejudice (or all of the above) that is prohibited. Safe 
space policies normally state what kinds of discrimination or prejudice they do not 
tolerate—typically, this includes discrimination or prejudice based on race, gender or 
gender identity, sexual orientation, class or socio-economic status, ability, age, 
nationality, ethnicity, and religion, and often extends to discrimination against sex-
workers and body-shaming. I take it that what is supposed to unify this list is that 
these are social categories on the basis of which certain groups have historically been 
and continue to be disadvantaged in enduring systems of oppression. As such, I think 
we can roughly understand the kind of speech that is centrally excluded in safe spaces 
to be racist, sexist, transphobic, homophobic, etc. speech—that is, what is often 
termed ‘hate speech’.  
There are two issues that arise from this. First, it seems that the characterisation 
of safe spaces as spaces where there are rules prohibiting ‘hate speech’ may be too 
broad, insofar as there are certain jurisdictions in which the law prohibits at least some 
forms of hate speech, and in many universities, there are institutional regulations 
prohibiting at least some forms of hate speech. For example, in the UK, there are laws 
prohibiting speech where the intention is to incite hatred on the grounds of race, 
religion, or sexual orientation, and there are anti-harassment laws which prohibit 
verbal harassment against others on the basis of “age, disability, gender reassignment, 
race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership, and 
pregnancy and maternity” in the workplace and other spaces.10 Further, universities 
often have codes of conduct that prohibit similar kinds of speech.11 However, I think 
safe spaces proper can be distinguished first by the relatively broad conception of 
oppressive or hate speech they employ, and second, by the fact that the rules are made 
clear in the space, and are much more likely to operate according to the rules that are 
in place. As I will explain in more detail in my first chapter, the speech excluded in 
safe spaces is not limited to ‘overt’ or conventionally recognised forms of hate speech, 
but extends to subtle and socially accepted forms, where the speaker may not even 
                                                          
10  See: the Public Order Act: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64/contents); the 
Equality Act 2010 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents).  
11 See: the UCL policy on harassment and bullying http://www.ucl.ac.uk/current-
students/guidelines/harassment-bullying   
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intend to be racist, sexist, etc. It is unclear that these forms of ‘hate speech’—what I 
will call borderline cases—would be prohibited by law or university policy. Even if 
such speech could be accommodated on a certain conception of incitement or 
harassment such that safe space rules are not clearly distinguishable from legal or 
institutional rules already operative in university contexts, safe spaces are still 
distinguishable by the fact that the rules are made clear in the space, such that there is 
a mutual expectation amongst participants that the rules be adhered to. Safe spaces 
are therefore more likely to operate according to the rules in place—laws or 
institutional policies regulating speech, in contrast, are not always clearly made known, 
and there is often a gap between legal norms and institutional policy on the one hand, 
and actual social practice on the other.  
The second issue is that it is unclear why rules prohibiting oppressive or hate 
speech in safe spaces should be necessary given that participants in safe space 
discussion groups are supposedly committed to resisting oppression. I think this 
worry largely rests on the assumption that oppressive speech involves the expression 
of consciously-held discriminatory beliefs and attitudes. As I have said above, the 
conception of oppressive speech employed in safe spaces extends to subtle, 
unintentional, and normalised forms. This conception is such that even those who are 
committed to resisting oppression may fail to notice or unintentionally engage in such 
speech. As such, rules that state that oppressive speech are not tolerated are useful in 
safe spaces to encourage attentiveness to what one’s speech and that of others implies 
and how it might function.  
A further point is that there are other kinds of expression that are often 
discouraged in safe spaces that perhaps do not fit under the general banner of ‘hate 
speech’. These include expressing scepticism and questioning the validity of members 
of marginalised groups’ perspectives on their own experience, and ‘tone-policing’—
that is, suggesting that marginalised groups express themselves differently when 
discussing issues surrounding their marginalisation, e.g. telling a black woman to calm 
down if she expresses herself with frustration about racist treatment. I take it that 
these kinds of speech are not tolerated in safe spaces in order to further a central aim 
of safe spaces of enabling marginalised groups to express themselves. The exclusion 
of these kinds of speech are a further way in which safe spaces might be distinguished 
from spaces that prohibit more overt forms of hate speech.  
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I have suggested that the borderline cases of hate speech that safe spaces exclude 
are generally thought acceptable. Similarly, scepticism and questioning about the 
validity of others’ experiences or suggesting that another should calm down in the 
context of a discussion space also are broadly seen as unproblematic, at least where 
these are not deliberate attempts to undermine others. Thus, I take it the rules in safe 
spaces primarily serve the function of pushing against conventional norms that are 
tacitly accepting of these kinds of expression, despite such forms of expression being 
problematic from the perspective of safe space advocates. As such, the rules in safe 
spaces can be seen to embody an aspiration to create a new practice, and are in place 
to habituate participants into this new practice.  
 
 
§2. Criticism of safe spaces 
 
In this section, I identify the two central criticisms of safe spaces which I will explore 
in my main chapters, namely (i) the ‘oversensitivity’ critique that safe spaces encourage 
a disposition to have inappropriate emotional responses to certain kinds of speech; 
and (ii) the ‘epistemic’ critique that safe spaces flout knowledge-conducive open 
discussion norms. I suggest that the sting of these criticisms of safe spaces derives 
from the fact that safe spaces exist within universities. I then provide an outline of my 
two main chapters, and conclusion.  
A perceived feature of safe spaces on which critics often focus is that they 
exclude certain forms of expression in order to protect students from marginalised 
groups from offence.12 A central concern of many critics is about the spreading of a 
‘safe space culture’ in universities—that is, a culture in which students seek to silence 
any expression that might cause offence, not just in safe spaces, but on a university-
wide scale. For instance, Spiked editor Joanna Williams writes that “[in] today’s 
marketed and consumer-driven higher-education sector, many students have come to 
expect freedom from speech. They argue the university campus should be a ‘safe space’, 
free from emotional harm or potential offence” (2016: 4). This idea is also echoed by 
writer Greg Lukianoff and psychologist Jonathan Haidt who warn that “a movement 
is arising, undirected and driven largely by students, to scrub campuses clean of words, 
                                                          
12 I will discuss whether this is a fair characterisation of safe spaces in my first chapter. 
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ideas, and subjects that might cause discomfort or give offense” (2015). I take it the 
issue is that it is bad to suppress certain viewpoints, and in a ‘safe space culture’, claims 
of offence (understood as a subjective response) license such suppression.  
Critics also often focus on the kinds of speech students seek to suppress in a 
‘safe space culture’, suggesting that those who are offended by such speech are 
oversensitive. For example, sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning suggest 
that student responses to ‘microaggressions’ and uncomfortable material “illustrate a 
high sensitivity to slight” (2015). Similarly, journalist Judith Shulevitz argues that while 
suppressing unfamiliar opinions and “keeping college discussions ‘safe’ may feel good 
to the hypersensitive, it’s bad for them and for everyone else […] They’ll be 
unprepared for the social and intellectual headwinds that will hit them as soon as they 
step off the campuses whose climates they have so carefully controlled. What will they 
do when they hear opinions they’ve learned to shrink from?” (2015). Thus, another 
issue seems to be that protection from offence validates and encourages 
oversensitivity amongst students.  
Now, it is unclear that there is a widespread ‘safe space culture’ on university 
campuses. Indeed, critics tend to frame fringe groups of students as having power 
they simply do not possess, or otherwise exaggerate the extent to which the 
commitments of safe space advocates are shared by the general student population. 
However, even if claims about the spread of a safe space culture in universities are 
overstated, I take it critics nevertheless think there is a problem in principle with safe 
spaces as university spaces that validate oversensitivity in students, and license the 
suppression of certain views. I want to suggest that underlies these criticisms and 
provides them with their particular force is a certain background conception of the 
university, and the kinds of dispositions and values they encourage in students. The 
particular problem with safe spaces as practices within the university is that the values 
they express and dispositions they inculcate are contrary to those that universities 
should properly seek to encourage in students. In the following, I clarify the two 
central issues that critics appear to have with safe spaces, and then suggest why these 
are particularly problematic in the university context. 
I have suggested two issues that critics appear to have with safe spaces: the first 
issue is that safe spaces encourage oversensitivity in students, and the second issue is that 
safe spaces license the suppression of certain viewpoints based on mere offence. Now, 
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as I will suggest in my first chapter, safe spaces do not protect people from merely 
any kind of offence, but rather (arguably) protect students from offence that arises 
from certain kinds of putatively oppressive speech. As such, safe spaces do not license 
the suppression of certain viewpoints merely based on offence. However, I take it 
what the critic takes to be problematic here is that safe spaces permit the suppression 
of certain views. Thus, I take it the second issue with safe spaces is that they exclude 
certain viewpoints from expression.   
In my first chapter, I will suggest that what critics mean by ‘oversensitivity’ is 
(broadly) a disposition to be offended by certain kinds of speech, where such offence-
taking is inappropriate. For critics, by protecting students from offence, safe spaces 
encourage amongst students a disposition to take offence that is inappropriate. Critics 
suggest that what is inappropriate or objectionable about this disposition is that it 
prevents students from being able to engage with certain viewpoints they find 
objectionable in a rational and civil manner, and from being able to psychologically 
cope with exposure to the kinds of speech that safe spaces have protected them from. 
This is problematic from the perspective of truth-seeking insofar as this is facilitated 
by calm and rational discussion with others, and because it undermines social cohesion 
and progress insofar as this requires civil engagement with those with whom we 
disagree (Lukianoff & Haidt 2015). Further, it fails to psychologically prepare students 
for a world in which they will regularly face the kinds of speech they have been 
protected from in safe spaces (ibid., Shulevitz 2015). I take it that it is particularly 
problematic for practices within the university to encourage such oversensitivity 
insofar as the perceived role of universities is to encourage dispositions in students 
that facilitate knowledge-seeking and good citizenship, and prepare them for the 
outside world. As such, it is a particular conception of the role of universities that 
provides the objection that safe spaces encourage oversensitivity its particular force. I 
will consider this oversensitivity critique of safe spaces in my first chapter. 
 The second issue is that safe spaces suppress certain viewpoints. As I will argue 
in my second chapter, it is a broadly Millian view about the epistemic value of what I 
will call ‘open discussion norms’—according to which all viewpoints on any given 
question should be tolerated and rationally engaged with—that seems to motivate the 
idea that the suppression of viewpoints is problematic. It is particularly problematic 
for practices within the university to flout knowledge-conducive open discussion norms 
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insofar as universities are institutions dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, where 
students should be encouraged to value such a pursuit and engage in practices of 
inquiry that facilitate the acquisition of truth and knowledge. As such, it is the fact 
that safe spaces exist in the university context that provides the objection that safe 
spaces flout open discussion norms its particular force. I will consider this epistemic 
critique of safe spaces in my second chapter.  
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Chapter 1: The Oversensitivity Critique 
 
In this chapter, I will attempt to reconstruct and respond to what I call the 
‘oversensitivity’ critique of safe spaces. This critique holds that safe spaces exclude 
speech to protect certain students from offence, and as such encourage a disposition 
to take offence to the speech excluded in safe spaces where this is inappropriate. Now, 
when critiquing this ‘oversensitive’ disposition, critics often focus on its negative 
consequences particularly for public life. I take it the force of this critique derives from a 
certain conception of the university, according to which a central role of universities 
is to encourage in students a certain emotional profile that prepares them for public 
life. However, there are further questions we can ask about the disposition to take 
offence to the excluded speech in safe spaces aside from whether they have negative 
consequences. First, we might ask whether the offence that students are disposed to 
take is fitting even if it has certain bad consequences, and second, we might ask whether 
offence is understandable such that it seems psychologically implausible or obtuse to 
suggest that students should not be disposed to so respond. Indeed, I take it that 
underlying the oversensitivity critics view is that the offence that safe spaces 
encourage is unfitting or not ‘understandable’. I will first explore the claim underlying 
the oversensitivity critique that safe spaces exclude speech on the basis that it causes 
offence, and grant this for the sake of argument. Then, I will argue that it is unclear 
that the disposition that safe spaces are taken to encourage is all-things-considered 
bad from a consequentialist perspective, and that there is a sense in which safe spaces 
encourage emotional sensitivity insofar as they encourage fitting affective responses to 
the speech excluded in safe spaces. I conclude by suggesting that it is unclear that the 
fitting emotional sensitivity that safe spaces seem to encourage should be discouraged 
in public life.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. I will begin in §1 with a brief survey of 
claims that are suggestive of the oversensitivity critique. In §2, I suggest that the 
oversensitivity critique depends on the idea that safe spaces restrict speech in order to 
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protect certain students from offence. I then consider whether this is a characterisation 
of safe spaces that the safe space advocate would accept, suggesting that it is unclear 
what the real grounds for excluding certain speech from safe spaces is. In §3, I explore 
the concept of ‘hate speech’ in order to get clear on the potential grounds for speech 
exclusions in safe spaces, and for the sake of argument, stipulate that feelings of 
offence play some role in justifying the speech exclusions in safe spaces. In §4, I will 
look at the kinds of speech that safe spaces distinctively exclude—namely what I will 
call ‘borderline cases of hate speech’, which includes ‘microaggressions’ and certain 
kinds of well-intentioned arguments. In §5, I will explore whether a disposition to take 
offence at borderline cases hate speech has the negative social consequences that 
critics suggest. I suggest that, on the one hand, anger and distress may be socially 
alienating and psychologically debilitating, but on the other, norms can change in such 
a way that mitigates these issues In §6, I will consider non-consequentialist ways in 
which affective responses may be evaluated. I distinguish between an emotion’s 
‘fittingness’ and its ‘appropriateness’, and suggest that affective responses can also be 
evaluated for whether they are ‘understandable’. I also consider which affective 
responses are at stake in the oversensitivity critique of safe spaces, suggesting that the 
relevant responses are anger or outrage, and psychological distress. In §7, I will 
motivate the idea that anger is a fitting response to borderline cases of hate speech, 
insofar as borderline cases of hate speech damage the proper social standing of 
marginalised groups. This also provides us with a way of seeing how borderline cases 
of hate speech understandably cause distress.  
 
 
§1. Critics on safe spaces and oversensitivity 
 
The term ‘oversensitivity’, or variations such as ‘hypersensitivity’, or ‘emotional 
fragility’, are often used in relation to students who use or endorse safe spaces. For 
example, in their co-authored article ‘The Coddling of the American Mind’, the liberal 
writer Greg Lukianoff and psychologist Jonathan Haidt write: 
 
[The new student movement] presumes an extraordinary fragility of the collegiate 
psyche, and therefore elevates the goal of protecting students from 
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psychological harm. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to turn campuses into “safe 
spaces” where young adults are shielded from words and ideas that make some 
uncomfortable … Schools may be training students in thinking styles that will 
damage their careers and friendships, along with their mental health … 
Attempts to shield students … are bad for the students … bad for the workplace 
… [and] they are bad for American democracy which is already paralyzed by 
worsening partisanship … the perpetual state of outrage that seems to engulf 
some colleges these days [should be toned down], allowing students’ minds to 
open more widely to new ideas and new people. (emphasis mine, Lukianoff & 
Haidt 2015)  
 
Similarly, the American journalist Judith Schulevitz, in her article ‘In College and 
Hiding from Scary Ideas’, claims: 
 
[S]afe spaces are the expression of a conviction, increasingly prevalent among 
college students, that their schools should keep them from being ‘bombarded’ 
by discomfiting or distressing viewpoints … while keeping college discussions 
‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, it’s bad for them and everyone else … 
They’ll be unprepared for the social and intellectual headwinds that will hit them 
as soon as they step off the campuses whose climates they have so carefully 
controlled. What will they do when they hear opinions they’ve learned to shrink 
from? (emphasis mine, Shulevitz 2015) 
 
Another example comes from sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning, who 
write in their article ‘The New Millennial ‘Morality’: Highly Sensitive and Easily 
Offended’: 
 
[Students are demanding] ‘safe spaces’ where [they] are protected from offense 
of any kind. What many find shocking about these phenomena is that they 
involve rejecting previously conventional moral injunctions to ignore insults, 
recognize the good intentions of those who accidentally give offense, and be 
charitable and civil toward those with whom we disagree. They instead illustrate 
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a high sensitivity to slight, such that verbal offenses or even disagreements merit a 
serious response (emphasis mine, Campbell & Manning 2015). 
  
The above criticisms suggest that safe spaces seek to protect students from certain 
negative affective responses, e.g. offence, upset, distress and discomfort, and that by 
doing so, they cater to or produce oversensitive students, or both. Further, they seem 
to focus on the bad practical consequences of the kind of emotional profile they take 
safe spaces to validate or encourage, both for the individual and for society as a whole. 
Now, the think-pieces from which these criticisms are excerpted specifically targeted 
at how practices within universities encourage oversensitivity. Indeed, I take it that the 
force of the oversensitivity critique largely derives from a background conception of 
the university as an institution whose social role is to prepare students for public life, 
such that practices within the university that undermine this aim are problematic. In 
what follows, I attempt to reconstruct and respond to the oversensitivity critique of 
safe spaces.  
 
§2. Oversensitivity and offence 
  
I will begin by looking at how the oversensitivity critic characterises safe spaces, for it 
is a particular understanding of safe spaces that seems to form the basis of the 
oversensitivity critique. The criticisms quoted above seem to characterise safe spaces 
as spaces that restrict expression to protect students in some way, and I want to 
suggest that what it is that safe spaces protect students from, according to critics, is 
offence. Indeed, in the critical commentary on safe spaces, safe spaces are often 
characterised as spaces that protect students from offence.13 
Now, ‘protection from offence’ can be understood in a few different ways. First, 
‘offence’ can be used to refer to a subjective response, specifically to certain kinds of 
unpleasant or painful affective responses, as when we ‘take offence’ or something 
‘causes offence’. It is what we feel when we feel offended. This reflects certain 
contemporary theoretical understandings of offence. For instance, Joel Feinberg takes 
                                                          
13 See e.g. Anthony (2016), Williams (2016). 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/24/safe-spaces-universities-no-platform-free-
speech-rhodes  
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offence to refer to “any or all of a miscellany of disliked mental states” including but 
not limited to upset, distress, outrage, disgust, shame, hurt, anxiety, shock, 
embarrassment, annoyance, boredom, anger, fear, and humiliation (1985: 1-5, 19, 30). 
Similarly, Jeremy Waldron suggests that distress, shock, anger and outrage can all be 
understood as types of offence, where offence is essentially a matter of hurt or 
wounded feelings (2012: 106-112). On this understanding of offence, protection from 
offence can be understood as protection from certain unpleasant or painful affective 
responses. 
Second, ‘offence’ can be used to refer to a violation of moral or legal norms, as 
in ‘criminal offence’. ‘Protection from offence’ in this sense seems to suggest 
protecting people specifically from others violating their moral or legal rights, rather 
than protecting them from others breaking the law or some moral code in general, 
which might include ‘protection’ from legal and moral violations where it is unclear 
that it makes sense to frame this in terms of protection, e.g. ‘protection’ from someone 
driving on the wrong side of the road on the other side of the country.  
Third, protection from offence might mean protection from that which is 
offensive. ‘Offensiveness’ is also an ambiguous term. If we call something offensive, we 
might just mean that it is something that causes or is likely to cause offence in the first, 
subjective sense—as in ‘this programme contains images that some viewers might find 
offensive’—such that protection from that which is offensive seems to boil down to 
protection from unpleasant or painful affective responses. However, it is also often 
used to refer to some objective property—for instance, it seems we can disagree about 
whether e.g. the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad are offensive, where 
what it is in question is not whether they are likely to cause offence in the subjective 
sense, but about whether the images possess certain objective features such that 
offence is in some sense a justified response to them. In this case, protection from 
offence would mean protection from things that one is in some sense justified in being 
offended by. There seems to be a similar ambiguity with terms like ‘distressing’ or 
‘upsetting’ which may refer to something that tends to cause distress, or to something 
that may understandably cause distress or upset.  
The relevant sense of ‘protection from offence’ for the oversensitivity critic is 
the first sense—as we can see from the quoted passages, critics suggest that students 
are demanding protection and being protected from certain negative feelings such as 
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upset, discomfort and distress.14 As such, I take it that the oversensitivity critics 
understand safe spaces as spaces that protect students from offence, where offence 
refers to certain unpleasant or painful affective responses.15  
 
Oversensitivity is a thick, negative term that I take to broadly refer to a disposition to 
have inappropriate affective responses. The idea that oversensitivity involves 
inappropriate responses is suggested by the use of the prefix ‘over-’, which implies 
that there is a kind of non-objectionable sensitivity that stands in contrast with an 
objectionable oversensitivity. In the passages above, critics begin from the idea that 
safe spaces are spaces which restrict certain forms of expression in order to protect 
students from offence, and suggest that this validates or encourages a disposition to 
take offence where this is inappropriate. One way of making sense of how protecting 
students from offence encourages offence is via the ‘coddling argument’. A common 
claim made by critics is that safe spaces coddle students. The idea is roughly that by 
restricting speech to protect students from offence, safe spaces make participants 
unduly sensitive to the restricted speech, in the sense that they lead them to be unduly 
offended when they encounter the kinds of speech that are excluded in safe spaces. 
This argument is supposed to work analogously with arguments about how ‘coddling’ 
children—protecting them from mild dangers, disappointments, criticism—leads 
them to be harmed more than they otherwise would have been when they encounter 
those things they have been protected from. Another related reason why safe spaces 
might be taken to encourage offence at the excluded speech is by framing the excluded 
speech as something students require protection from. Insofar as this frames the 
speech as harmful, angry reactions to such speech seem natural. Moreover, as I 
mentioned in the introduction, safe spaces often have rules against tone-policing, 
which includes silencing or invalidating angry or distressed responses to harmful 
speech. As such, safe spaces seem to validate reactions of offence to the excluded 
speech. 
                                                          
14 Some critics claim that safe spaces protect students from discomfiting, distressing, upsetting or 
offensive speech, rather than protecting them from discomfort, distress, etc. (Schulevitz 2015). I 
have suggested that terms such as ‘distressing’ and ‘offensive’ can be understood both in terms 
of the subjective responses the speech tends to cause, and in terms of objective properties of the 
speech—I take it the former sense is what critics have in mind. 
15 Henceforth I will use ‘offence’ to broadly refer to unpleasant or painful affective responses, 
unless otherwise indicated.  
28 
 
The oversensitivity critique thus seems to rest on the idea that safe spaces 
protect students from offence, in the first, subjective sense of the term. However, it 
is unclear whether the safe space advocate would accept this characterisation. For 
instance, safe space policies state that it is ‘discriminatory’, ‘hateful’ or ‘oppressive’ 
speech that is not tolerated in safe spaces, and although they often claim to protect 
students from oppressed or marginalised groups, they generally make no mention of 
protecting such students from offence.16 
The notion that safe spaces protect students from offence, then, seems to 
instead be motivated first by the use of the term ‘safe’, which suggests protection from 
harm or injury; and second, by the fact that defenders of safe spaces tend to emphasise 
the emotional protections that safe spaces afford. For example, Northwestern 
University president Morton Schapiro writes, “experts tell me that students don’t fully 
embrace uncomfortable learning unless they are themselves comfortable. Safe spaces 
provide that comfort” (2016). And in a Guardian article on safe spaces, a former 
president of the Cambridge Union is quoted as saying that “[if] you think your case is 
offensive, you haven’t found the right case to make. You should go back and find 
another one which doesn’t appear prima facie to be offensive. There are ways of 
debating these things which aren’t hurtful” (2015). Such defences seem to suggest that 
when safe spaces claim to protect oppressed groups, what they are protecting them 
from are certain unpleasant and painful feelings. As such, I take it that for the 
oversensitivity critic, either oppressive (etc.) speech is understood by safe spaces just 
as speech that generally causes offence to students whom they perceive to be 
marginalised or oppressed; or, while oppressive, etc. speech is objectively 
characterisable, it is excluded in safe spaces just because of its likelihood to cause 
offence to students whom they perceive to be marginalised or oppressed, rather than 
because of its objective, negative characteristics. In either case, the real grounds for 
excluding certain speech from safe spaces is that it causes offence to certain groups 
of students.  
                                                          
16 See e.g. Goldsmiths Students’ Union Safe Space Policy 
https://www.goldsmithssu.org/pageassets/yourunion/governance/policies/Safe-Space-
Policy.pdf; Manchester Students’ Union Safe Space Policy https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/nusdigital/document/documents/17915/2474048df1f844083a5a1a91da3dc
5bd/Safe%20Space%20Policy%20ws.pdf; University of Birmingham LGBTQ Association Safe 
Space Policy http://students.guild.bham.ac.uk/lgbtq/wp-content/uploads/University-of-
Birmingham-LGBTQ-Association-Safe-Space-Policy.pdf 
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It is unclear what the safe space advocate takes the real grounds for excluding certain 
speech in safe spaces to be. On the one hand, they might reject that the real grounds 
for excluding speech is that it causes offence, and instead argue that they exclude 
certain speech because it is morally problematic in some sense, where this is an 
objective feature of the excluded speech. Certainly, it seems safe spaces do not seek 
to protect students from marginalised groups from offence in the sense of protecting 
them from any speech that any one such student happens to be offended by. This 
would mean that if some student from any marginalised group was offended by the 
expression of support for e.g. a woman’s right to choose or same-sex marriage, then 
such speech would be excluded in safe spaces, when this presumably is speech that 
would be permitted. And while safe spaces may exclude speech that students from 
marginalised groups generally tend to be offended by, it doesn’t follow that the grounds 
for excluding such speech is that it causes offence to those groups. For example, safe 
spaces may not tolerate claims like ‘Muslims are terrorists’ which Muslim students 
may generally find offensive, but the real grounds for exclusion of such speech could 
just be that such speech is Islamophobic, where this is an objective feature of the 
speech. On this view, safe spaces would protect certain students from offence, but 
only incidentally, insofar as the kinds of morally problematic speech they exclude tend 
to cause offence. 
On the other hand, the safe space advocate might argue that the real grounds 
for excluding certain speech from safe spaces is that it causes offence, but only where 
such offence arises in response to certain kinds of speech. This need not rely on a 
commitment to any general ‘right to not be offended’, if there is something distinctive 
about the offence caused that makes it such that those students who are offended 
ought to be protected from it. For instance, while there is no legal right not to be 
offended, there are laws protecting people from ‘intentional infliction of emotional 
distress’ which is distinguished mainly by the severity of distress caused intentionally 
or due to reckless disregard of another, e.g. falsely informing someone that a close 
family member has died (Waldron 2012: 110-11). Thus, the safe space advocate would 
reject that safe spaces restrict speech that merely offends students from certain 
groups—the question is whether the reason for excluding certain kinds of speech in 
safe spaces is just that such speech has objectively characterisable morally problematic 
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features, or that the speech causes offence of a kind that people ought to be protected 
from.  
 
§3. Hate speech and the grounds of speech exclusions in safe spaces 
There are some parallels between the issue of what justifies speech exclusions in safe 
spaces, and what justifies the legal regulation of hate speech. Indeed, some hate speech 
theorists argue that hate speech is speech whose problematic nature is to be 
characterised objectively, whereas others suggest it is to be understood primarily in 
terms of the subjective responses it gives rise to. Moreover, hate speech seems to bear 
some broad similarities to the speech excluded in safe spaces. As such, I think looking 
at the potential grounds for hate speech regulation can clarify the two options for 
what might justify speech exclusions in safe spaces.  
‘Hate speech’ broadly refers to a kind of normatively problematic speech that 
targets a particular social identity group or individual in virtue of her membership in 
some social identity group, where the target group is typically distinguished by race, 
ethnicity, gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or ability 
(Brison 1998, Delgado & Stefancic 2009, Simpson 2013). On this broad 
characterisation of hate speech, hate speech seems to bear some similarity to the 
speech that are regulated by safe space policies, which generally characterise the kinds 
of expression that are not to be tolerated as ‘discriminatory’, ‘hateful’, or ‘oppressive’ 
speech—and which normally state that it is discrimination based on race, gender or 
gender identity, sexual orientation, class or socio-economic status, ability, age, 
nationality, ethnicity, and religion that they do not tolerate.17 
There are differences in the ways that different authors cash out the sense in 
which hate speech ‘targets’ a particular group. Some suggest that hate speech 
expresses certain hostile attitudes towards certain groups. For instance, J. Angelo 
Corlett and Robert Francescotti characterise hate speech as speech that “expresses 
intense antipathy towards some group or individual on the basis of membership in 
some group” (2002: 1083). Others add that some intention to harm certain groups or 
members of certain groups is necessary. Caroline West, for example, defines racist 
hate speech as speech “that expresses derogatory feelings about, or attitudes towards, 
                                                          
17 See e.g. Goldsmiths Safe Space Policy (Introduction). 
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people on the basis of their race in order 1) directly to inflict psychological injury on 
them […] or 2) to incite in third parties hostility towards or hatred for them, or both” 
(2012: 232). Others instead characterise hate speech primarily in terms of its 
distinctive content, as expressing a certain denigrating message about certain groups. 
For example, Mari Matsuda characterises racist hate speech as centrally involving a 
message of racial inferiority, where the claim of inferiority is made about historically 
oppressed groups (1993).18 
These various characterisations are not mutually exclusive, but the different 
authors suggest that the features they identify are sufficient for an instance of speech 
to constitute hate speech. In any case, although there are differences in how different 
authors precisely characterise hate speech, they generally argue that such speech is 
objectionable due to the harm it causes to target groups. I want to focus here on two 
kinds of ways in which hate speech is thought to harm target groups—one, that hate 
speech damages the social standing of target groups, and two, that hate speech causes 
emotional distress amongst target groups, insofar as these two options for what might 
justify hate speech regulations map on to the two options above for what justifies 
speech restrictions in safe spaces.19  
Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan identify a class of theories of hate 
speech—what they call ‘constitutive’ theories—which have in common the idea that 
hate speech harms its target by “affecting the positions of groups to which those 
targets belong within the social hierarchy” (2012: 7). For instance, it has been argued 
that hate speech constitutes harm by subordinating target groups (Maitra 2012), or by 
assaulting the basic social standing of target groups (Waldron 2012). For such theorists, 
hate speech is objectionable due to its constitutive role in sustaining the lower social 
standing of target groups in an identity-based social hierarchy. On this kind of view, 
hate speech may cause offence, but this does not constitute grounds for its exclusion. 
For instance, Waldron acknowledges that the target groups of hate speech will 
                                                          
18 West (2012) and Matsuda (1993) both focus on racist hate speech, but suggest that their 
analysis can be extended to others forms of hate speech.  
19 Some hate speech theorists are concerned primarily with identifying the morally objectionable 
feature(s) of hate speech, without making the further claim that such features justify legal 
regulation. Indeed, I take it safe spaces need not advocate widespread institutional or legal 
restriction of the excluded speech—the rules regulating speech primarily embody an aspiration to 
create a new speech practice (that extends beyond the space), as opposed to advocating top-down 
regulation beyond the space.  
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typically experience feelings of offence such as emotional distress, upset, anger, and 
humiliation in response to such speech, but argues that these subjective responses 
“are not a proper object of legislative concern” (2012: 105-7). One way of 
understanding the grounds for speech exclusions in safe spaces, then, is in terms of 
the excluded speech being such that it damages the social standing of target groups, 
rather than in terms of any offence such speech gives rise to.  
Another kind of argument advanced in favour of hate speech regulation is that 
the emotional distress that hate speech causes in its targets constitutes grounds for 
regulating such speech. This suggests that the causing of unpleasant or painful 
affective responses plays a justificatory role in restricting hate speech. This is similar 
to one of the potential justifications for restricting speech in safe spaces, namely on 
the basis that the excluded speech causes offence of some kind. In much the same 
way that, for the safe space advocate, it seems to be only offence arising from certain 
kinds of speech that constitute grounds for speech restrictions, it seems that for 
certain advocates of hate speech regulation, it is the distress and anxiety arising from 
certain kinds of speech that constitutes grounds for its regulation.  
It is unclear what precisely distinguishes the painful affective responses arising 
from hate speech from similar responses arising from other kinds of speech, such that 
hate speech in particular warrants regulation. One suggestion from Matsuda is that 
the emotional distress suffered by targets of hate speech is particularly objectionable 
because it is an emotional burden borne only by certain groups—in particular, groups 
which are already disadvantaged. As she puts it, “[t]olerance of hate speech is not 
tolerance borne by the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on 
those least able to pay” (Matsuda 1993: 18). But why think there is a degree or kind 
of pain arising from speech that only those groups that are already disadvantaged must 
bear? Richard Delgado suggests racial insults have a greater potential for harm than 
mere insults because they target people based on certain unalterable features that have 
historically and continue to socially mark them for discrimination—they are painful 
reminders of the victim’s historical and enduring lower status which deeply affect their 
sense of self-worth (1993: 90, 95). This suggests that it is precisely because certain 
identity groups are already disadvantaged that identity-based insults are particularly 
emotionally damaging. For such authors, this objectionable emotional distress arises 
from speech that is “degrading”, that “denies the personhood of target group 
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members”, or constitutes a “dignitary affront” (Matsuda 1993: 36, Delgado 1993: 94); 
however, it is the affective responses such speech gives rise to that properly 
constitutes the grounds for hate speech regulations. 
Some safe space advocates seem to endorse the similar idea that feelings of 
offence that arise from certain kinds of degrading speech play a justificatory role in 
restricting speech in safe spaces. For instance, in an article defending safe spaces, 
Cameron Okeke writes: 
 
[A]s a first-generation black student, I needed safe spaces like the Office of 
Multicultural Student Affairs—not to ‘hide from ideas and perspectives at odds 
with my own’—but to heal from relentless hate and ignorance, to hear and be heard. 
My ideas were always challenged, but never my humanity. I mattered” (emphasis mine, 
2016). 
 
Similarly, Advocates for Youth (2005) define a safe space as follows: 
 
[a] place where anyone can relax and be fully self-expressed, without fear of being 
made to feel uncomfortable, unwelcome, or unsafe on account of biological sex, 
race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, cultural 
background, age, or physical or mental ability; a place where the rules guard each 
person’s self-respect and dignity and strongly encourage everyone to respect others” 
(emphasis mine).20  
 
In both cases, the suggestion is that a central purpose of safe spaces is to protect 
students from marginalised groups from distress or discomfort by protecting them 
from disrespect or indignity.  
The issue that the safe space advocate faces seems to be an issue that also divides 
hate speech theorists, and it is unclear which side safe space advocates are on, or 
should be on. I will not attempt to settle this question here. My concern is not so 
much with how the speech exclusions in safe spaces might be justified, as with the 
question of what the oversensitivity critique amounts to, and whether it is plausible. 
                                                          
20 See the Advocates for Youth ‘Creating a Safe Space for GLBTQ Youth: A Toolkit’ here: 
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage/advfy/documents/safespace.pdf  
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As such, I want to grant the critics’ supposition that the fact that certain putatively 
degrading speech causes offence plays some role in justifying its restriction in safe 
spaces. This is for the sake of argument, but also because, as I have shown, there is 
some reason to think that safe spaces do not restrict certain speech simply because of 
its perceived objective, negative features.   
 
§4. Borderline cases of hate speech 
 
The oversensitivity critique begins with the idea that safe spaces excluded certain kinds 
of speech to protect students from offence, and holds that participants in safe spaces 
encourage a disposition to take offence to the excluded speech where this is 
inappropriate. In order to consider whether taking offence to the excluded speech is 
inappropriate, we need a more precise characterisation of the excluded speech. I have 
suggested that the speech excluded in safe spaces bears some similarity to ‘hate speech’, 
in that it is speech that is perceived to be degrading of certain groups distinguished by 
race, ethnicity, gender or gender identity, etc., but that safe space policies are not so 
illuminating when it comes to a more precise characterisation of the excluded speech. 
Now, as I suggested in my introduction, the speech that safe spaces exclude in practice 
goes beyond overt hate speech to borderline cases of such speech. I take it that what 
critics primarily object to are the affective responses that safe spaces encourage to 
such borderline cases of hate speech.  
Indeed, many critics of safe spaces focus on how students are over-reacting to 
‘microaggressions’, and ‘shutting down debate’21—for instance, Lukianoff and Haidt 
write, “[t]he recent collegiate trend of uncovering allegedly racist, sexist, classist, or 
otherwise discriminatory microaggressions doesn’t incidentally teach students to focus 
on small or accidental slights. Its purpose is to get students to focus on them and then 
relabel the people who have made such remarks as aggressors”. They then go on to 
claim that “the focus on microaggressions […] is a formula for a constant state of 
                                                          
21 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12022041/How-political-
correctness-rules-in-Americas-student-safe-spaces.html  
http://time.com/4115439/student-protests-microaggressions/  
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/sep/14/theresa-may-criticises-university-safe-
spaces-for-shutting-down-debate 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/29/u-chicago-letter-new-students-safe-
spaces-sets-intense-debate  
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outrage, even toward well-meaning speakers trying to engage in genuine discussion” 
(2015). Although the excluded speech in safe spaces would include overt hate speech 
of the kind with certain of the features suggested above, the oversensitivity critic 
seems largely concerned with the responses students are having to the speech 
distinctively excluded in safe spaces, what we might call ‘borderline cases’ of hate 
speech—namely, microaggressions and certain well-intentioned arguments that target 
members of marginalised groups—which I will now briefly outline in turn.  
Microaggressions are often defined as everyday minor or unintentional insults 
and degradations that target and are commonly experienced by members of 
marginalised groups (Pierce 1995, Wing Sue et al. 2007, Rini 2015).22 Examples might 
include a man explaining (or ‘mansplaining’) a woman’s research project to her; 
students of colour being asked for identification by university security while white 
students are not;23 or a straight person saying, “but you seem normal!” to a gay 
person.24 These are ‘minor’ insults and degradations in the sense that they do not 
involve any explicit claims of the inherent inferiority of certain marginalised groups, 
but rather subtly echo negative stereotypes, or highlight an individual’s deviance from 
the normal in virtue of their social group identity, or deviance from the norm for their 
social identity group. Microaggressions are also often unintentional in the sense that 
the ‘microaggressor’ does not intend to demean or disrespect the target or target group 
of the microaggression. They are also often described as ‘automatic’, expressive of 
unconscious interpretive habits and expectations (Pierce et al. 1978, Wing Sue et al. 
2007). Further, the microaggressor need not consciously endorse the representations 
of target groups that underlie his microaggressive speech or behaviour (Anderson 
2010: 47-8). 
It is important to note that despite individual microaggressions being relatively 
‘minor’, what distinguishes microaggressions from other minor and unintentional 
insults is that they are instances of general patterns of similar treatment experienced 
                                                          
22  
23 https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/life-as-a-black-rhodes-scholar-are-you-a-
construction-worker  
24 24 The line between microaggressive behaviour and overtly discriminatory behaviour is not 
often clear, and depends to a significant extent on what kind of behaviour is widely considered to 
be discriminatory.  
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by marginalised groups.25 As Regina Rini (2015) notes, there is a growing amount of 
testimony on social media from marginalised groups about the microaggressions they 
experience in various spheres of social life, which allow us to see microaggressions as 
patterns of subtle disrespect and mistreatment.26 Microaggressions are thus not simply 
expressive of the attitudes of particular individuals, but rather seem to be expressive 
of socially entrenched interpretive habits and expectations regarding certain groups. 
Finally, the specific features of microaggressions make it such that they can appear to 
be innocuous. For instance, the man explaining a woman’s research project to her 
could be seen to be generally arrogant rather than treating the woman as intellectually 
inferior specifically in virtue of her gender. Similarly, it could be argued that the 
university security guard was carrying out a random check when asking a black student 
for his identification, rather than acting on the presumption that the student was 
unlikely to attend the university because he was black. Indeed, in many putative cases 
of microaggressive conduct, it will be unclear whether the speech or behaviour in 
question stems from a subconscious application of a stereotype or of a norm for a 
certain group, or whether it stems from something else.    
A similar kind of speech excluded in safe spaces are certain ‘well-intentioned’ 
arguments and lines of questioning that are perceived to be harmful to certain social 
identity groups, while being apparently motivated by intellectual honesty, rather than 
any hostility towards or intention to harm the relevant group. Some real-life examples 
of such arguments might include Peter Singer’s arguments that certain disabled people 
are of lower moral worth than able-bodied people, such that killing certain disabled 
infants is permissible (1979); Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein’s arguments in 
their book, The Bell Curve, which uses statistical analysis to argue for variations in 
intelligence amongst different racial groups, suggesting that this explains certain 
differences in the socio-economic status of different racial groups (1994); and Rebecca 
Tuvel’s recent paper arguing for the claim that “considerations that support 
                                                          
25 The psychologist Chester Pierce who coined the term ‘micro-aggressions’ describes them as 
‘incessant’, ‘omnipresent’, ‘repetitive’ (1980: 251).  
26  Websites that catalogue microaggressions include the website ‘Microaggressions’ 
(http://www.microaggressions.com/) and the ‘Everyday Sexism’ website 
(https://everydaysexism.com/). Articles on popular websites also list examples of common 
microaggressions, see e.g. Nigatu (2013), Nigatu (2014). Further, studies in psychology such as 
Wing Sue et al. (2007) and Capodilupo et al. (2010) contain taxonomies of microaggressions. 
37 
 
transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism” (2017: cite). 27  What 
distinguishes the kinds of ‘well-intentioned’ arguments in question from the non-
objectionable kinds is that the former are perceived to broadly follow certain logics 
that are often used to rationalise the devaluation and mistreatment of certain groups, 
and embed certain entrenched and mistaken ideas about them. For instance, analogies 
between transgender and so-called transracial identity that focus only on the shared 
feature of self-identification with an identity category are often used as a reductio ad 
absurdum of the legitimacy of trans identity and of claims for trans rights both by 
cultural conservatives who deem both race and gender to be a matter of nature, and 
by radical feminists who deem both race and gender to be a matter of a life-long lived 
history of being perceived as a particular race or gender in virtue of certain biological 
characteristics (Brubaker 2016).  Those who draw such analogies need not employ 
them with the intention of delegitimising trans identity—indeed, Tuvel herself is 
expressly committed to trans rights and concerned about the potential unjust 
treatment of hypothetical ‘transracial’ people28—but they may nevertheless employ a 
logic that is often used to delegitimise trans identity, and may appear to bear out 
common attitudes about trans people as confused about their gender identity, or 
mentally ill. 
I call the above arguments ‘well-intentioned’, then, because by citing putative 
evidence and putting forward arguments for certain claims—arguments which, 
moreover, do not seem to rely on any explicitly racist, ableist, or transphobic 
premises—these authors at least appear to be primarily concerned with getting things 
right, rather than dog-whistling bigots, or lending intellectual respectability to certain 
harmful patterns of thinking.   
Although ‘borderline cases’ of hate speech share with hate speech the feature of 
being targeted at certain social identity groups, and are similarly perceived to be 
                                                          
27 University guest lectures by Charles Murray and Peter Singer have recently been disrupted by 
student protestors, because of their expressed views on race and intelligence, and views on 
disability and ‘support for eugenics’ respectively. Rebecca Tuvel’s article ‘In Defence of 
Transracialism’ also provoked outrage, and calls for its retraction Although the practice of 
attempting to block speakers and get publications retracted is distinct from safe space practice 
and raises slightly different issues, both practices seem to share a similar underlying principle that 
in certain cases, certain ‘well-intentioned’ arguments harm certain groups such that they are better 
left unexpressed.  
28 Tuvel’s statement on the controversy surrounding her paper can be found here: 
http://dailynous.com/2017/05/01/philosophers-article-transracialism-sparks-controversy/  
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harmful or degrading to target groups, it is unclear that they fit any of the more precise 
characterisations of hate speech outlined above. They need not express hate or 
hostility towards target groups; the speaker need not intend to cause harm or spread 
hatred; and it is unclear that they must contain a message of inferiority. Of course, 
safe spaces also exclude hate speech that does possess these features, but it seems that 
it is these ‘borderline cases’ that are distinctively excluded in safe spaces, and which 
fuel oversensitivity critics. Indeed, such critics are unlikely to accept the suggestion 
that these borderline cases of hate speech are harmful or degrading—a claim which 
at least requires further elaboration.29 As such, for the sake of neutrality, I will refer 
to the speech restricted in safe spaces either as ‘the excluded speech’, or as ‘borderline 
cases of hate speech’, where this refers for now to putatively harmful speech such as 
microaggressions and the kinds of well-intentioned arguments mentioned above.  
 
§5. The ‘bad disposition’ oversensitivity critique  
 
The central claim of the oversensitivity critique is that safe spaces encourage in student 
participants a disposition to take offence to the borderline cases of hate speech 
mentioned above, where this is inappropriate. In this section, I will first consider what 
specific affective responses are at stake in the oversensitivity critique, which I identify 
as distress and anger. Then, I will consider the relevant sense in which taking offence 
to borderline cases of hate speech is inappropriate, suggesting that the problem is that 
it is indicative of a ‘bad disposition’, understood as a disposition that has all-things-
considered bad practical consequences. Finally, I consider whether the disposition to 
take offence to borderline cases of hate speech is all-things-considered bad from a 
consequentialist perspective. 
 First, following certain standard understandings of offence (Feinberg 1985, 
Waldron 2012), I have been using ‘offence’ as a catch-all term to refer to various 
painful or unpleasant emotions or feelings. As such, an initial problem when it comes 
to assessing whether offence-taking is inappropriate is that it is unclear what the 
specific affective responses in question are. Indeed, there are a number of affective 
responses that could be involved in the oversensitivity critique. I will focus on two: 
                                                          
29 At least, where ‘harmful’ does not simply mean ‘causes offence’. 
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distress and anger. First, I focus on distress because I take it that coddling argument 
is about responses that can largely by subsumed under the category of distress. I focus 
secondly on anger because I take it this is the response that is encouraged by framing 
the excluded speech as harmful.  
In what sense is offence-taking an inappropriate affective response to borderline 
cases of hate speech? Recall the claims of oversensitivity critics: 
 
[The new student movement] presumes an extraordinary fragility of the collegiate 
psyche, and therefore elevates the goal of protecting students from 
psychological harm. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to turn campuses into “safe 
spaces” where young adults are shielded from words and ideas that make some 
uncomfortable … Schools may be training students in thinking styles that will 
damage their careers and friendships, along with their mental health … 
Attempts to shield students … are bad for the students … bad for the workplace 
… [and] they are bad for American democracy which is already paralyzed by 
worsening partisanship … the perpetual state of outrage that seems to engulf 
some colleges these days [should be toned down], allowing students’ minds to 
open more widely to new ideas and new people. (emphasis mine, Lukianoff & 
Haidt 2015)  
 
[S]afe spaces are the expression of a conviction, increasingly prevalent among 
college students, that their schools should keep them from being ‘bombarded’ 
by discomfiting or distressing viewpoints … while keeping college discussions 
‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, it’s bad for them and everyone else … 
They’ll be unprepared for the social and intellectual headwinds that will hit them 
as soon as they step off the campuses whose climates they have so carefully 
controlled. What will they do when they hear opinions they’ve learned to shrink 
from? (emphasis mine, Shulevitz 2015) 
 
[Students are demanding] ‘safe spaces’ where [they] are protected from offense 
of any kind. What many find shocking about these phenomena is that they 
involve rejecting previously conventional moral injunctions to ignore insults, 
recognize the good intentions of those who accidentally give offense, and be 
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charitable and civil toward those with whom we disagree. They instead illustrate 
a high sensitivity to slight, such that verbal offenses or even disagreements merit a 
serious response (emphasis mine, Campbell & Manning 2015). 
 
The first thing to note is the critics’ focus on the negative consequences of taking offence 
to the speech excluded in safe spaces. In their respective pieces, Lukianoff and Haidt 
(2015) and Shulevitz (2015) both emphasise how such offence-taking prevents 
students from engaging with others in a rational and civil manner. They suggest that 
this is problematic both from the perspective of truth-seeking insofar as this is 
facilitated by calm and rational discussion with others, and because it undermines 
social cohesion and progress insofar as this requires civil engagement with those with 
whom we disagree. Further, Lukianoff and Haidt argue that validating such offence-
taking rather than teaching students to brush certain comments off is psychologically 
damaging, insofar as students will regularly face the kinds of speech they have been 
protected from in safe spaces (2015). This suggests the sense in which such offence-
taking is inappropriate is that it has overall bad consequences. The problem is not so 
much that particular instances of offence-taking at borderline cases of hate speech are 
inappropriate; rather, it is a pattern of taking offence at such speech that is 
inappropriate, where such a pattern is symptomatic of a disposition to take offence at 
such speech. Hence, I suggest that the oversensitivity critique can be understood as 
the claim that safe spaces encourage an all-things-considered ‘bad disposition’ from a 
consequentialist perspective. I suggested above that the oversensitivity critique is 
focused on how practices within universities are encouraging such offence-taking in 
students, and I take it that it is particularly problematic for practices within the 
university to encourage such offence-taking insofar as the perceived role of 
universities is to encourage dispositions in students that facilitate knowledge-seeking 
and good citizenship, and prepare them for the outside world.  
 
Now, it seems true that anger and distress at microaggressions and well-intentioned 
arguments are not particularly conducive to good social relations and productive 
discussion. For instance, it seems that anger at these borderline cases of hate speech 
would tend to create an environment of hostility where people are put on the 
defensive, and distress at borderline cases of hate speech may prevent one from being 
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able to fully participate in work life. Further, insofar as it is likely that people will 
regularly face things like microaggressions due to their pervasive nature, it seems 
psychologically debilitating to get angry or distressed about them all.  
One problem with this is that it is unclear that norms cannot change such that 
these problems with offence-taking are mitigated. Social norms about how to behave 
so that we do not offend others already exist, and it is unclear why these cannot change 
so that borderline cases of hate speech become socially unacceptable. Indeed, an early 
example of microaggressions in the psychological literature involves a case where a 
white woman felt so uncomfortable sitting next to a black man on an aeroplane that 
she requested to swap seats (Pierce 1980). Clearly norms of acceptable behaviour have 
changed since then if the woman’s behaviour here is supposed to be an example of 
subtly racist treatment—to our ears, this sounds unambiguously and overtly racist, 
unlike perhaps the kinds of examples of microaggressions outlined above. As such, 
drawing attention to these offensive kinds of treatment can generate an awareness 
that in turn can generate changes in social norms. One strategy for changing social 
norms such that borderline cases of hate speech become less acceptable is through 
expressing offence at such hate speech, insofar as this communicates the idea that 
such speech is offensive to certain groups, and imposes certain social costs on those 
who engage in such speech. Thus, if safe spaces validate offence-taking to borderline 
cases of hate speech, this may be part of a process that changes social norms in such 
a way that makes such speech socially unacceptable, and mitigates the bad 
consequences of such offence-taking.  
Of course, there is a further question of whether such changes in norms should 
occur. In general, where affective responses or dispositions to have affective 
responses in certain situations have bad consequences, it seems there is always a 
question of whether we should focus on encouraging the agent not to feel the relevant 
emotions or feelings, or whether we should focus on changing features of the situation 
to mitigate these bad consequences. Where an agent has a disposition to have certain 
emotional responses that has overall bad consequences, then, to say that they are 
‘oversensitive’ is to choose to focus on the agent as the source of the problem. I take 
it the idea that it is the safe space students who need to change stems largely from an 
underlying assumption that anger or distress at borderline cases of hate speech are not 
‘fitting’ or ‘understandable’ responses—that is, insofar as such responses fail to be, in 
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some sense, justified, or understandable, it is acceptable to simply focus on the 
consequences of such offence-taking. In the next section, I look at these two non-
consequentialist ways of evaluating affective responses. 
 
§6. Non-consequentialist ways of evaluating affective responses 
 
In their critique of the disposition to take offence to borderline cases of hate speech, 
oversensitivity critics largely focus on the negative consequences of having such a 
disposition. However, they are other ways of evaluating affective responses, such that 
emotional responses may be appropriate even if they underwrite an all-things-
considered ‘bad disposition’. In this section, I want to look at two non-
consequentialist ways in which affective responses may be evaluated: first, they can be 
evaluated for fittingness; and second, they can be evaluated for whether they are 
understandable.  
First, a common idea in the philosophy of emotions is that an emotion can be 
evaluated for its ‘fittingness’ (D’Arms & Jacobson 2000, Bell 2013, Srinivasan 2017). 
The background idea is that emotions are not simply sensations, but rather somehow 
represent the world as having certain evaluative features. For example, feeling guilty 
about something I have done involves affectively representing what I have done as 
wrongful. Feeling pity for someone involves affectively representing their situation as 
unfortunate. Feeling fear involves affectively representing the object of fear as some 
kind of threat. And so on. If, then, someone feels guilty when they have in fact done 
nothing wrong, and we say that their guilt is inappropriate, what we might mean by 
this is that their guilt incorrectly represents what they have done as wrongful—that is, 
that their guilt is unfitting. I take it to affectively represent something as wrongful is 
distinct from believing that it is wrongful, and involves a certain appreciation of the 
evaluative features of a situation that a belief cannot provide. For instance, I might 
believe that a terrorist attack in Baghdad is as tragic as one in Paris, but in grieving for 
one and not the other, it seems I only properly appreciate the tragedy of one and not 
the other. Now, the question of whether an emotion is fitting in response to a certain 
phenomenon can come apart from the question of whether a disposition to have such 
an emotional response to similar phenomena is all-things-considered good. For 
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example, anger at racial microaggressions may be fitting, even if a disposition to get 
angry at racial microaggressions has overall negative consequences.  
Second, we might say that certain affective responses are understandable. If a 
child is constantly bullied and feels extremely anxious about going to school each 
morning. The child’s anxiety does not seem to have overall good consequences, and 
it is unclear that anxiety has any fittingness conditions such that it could evaluated for 
fittingness. Nevertheless, we may say that the child’s anxious feelings are 
understandable, and not the result of any kind of oversensitivity.  
 
 
§7. Fittingness and understandability  
 
In this section, I will consider whether the offence-taking that safe spaces encourage 
is fitting, and whether it is understandable—specifically, I focus on whether anger is 
fitting (as an emotion with fittingness condition) and whether distress is 
understandable. I will begin by looking at what kind of evaluative presentation is 
involved in anger, and then consider whether it is a fitting response to borderline cases 
of hate speech. Then, I suggest that this motivates the idea that distress is an 
understandable response to borderline cases of hate speech.  
Anger is a complex emotion that is characterised in various ways, but an 
uncontroversial, necessary feature of anger seems to be that it involves representing 
its object as involving a normative violation of some kind. Some suggest that anger 
can respond to any kind of (perceived) normative violation, whether moral or non-
moral (Bell 2009, Callard forthcoming, Cherry m.s.), while others suggest anger 
responds to (perceived) violations of specifically moral norms (Frye 1983, Nussbaum 
2016, Srinivasan forthcoming). For our purposes, the relevant sense of anger is anger 
that represents its object as involving a moral violation—we are concerned with the 
anger that safe spaces are taken to encourage by their framing of certain kinds of 
speech as harmful or degrading to certain groups. On this characterisation of anger, 
then, it seems that anger at the excluded speech will only misrepresent the speech if the 
excluded speech does not constitute a moral violation. Thus, as a potential response 
to the unfittingness (misrepresentation) critique as applied to responses of anger to 
the excluded speech, I want to motivate the idea that the excluded speech does 
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constitute a kind of moral violation—in particular, I want to motivate the claim that 
such speech is, in some sense, ‘degrading’—such that anger does not involve a 
misrepresentation of the excluded speech.  
In §3 above, I mentioned that ‘constitutive theorists’ argue that hate speech is 
objectionable because it damages the proper social standing of target groups. I want 
to suggest that borderline cases of hate speech may be taken to be morally 
objectionable for the same reason. The claims of constitutive theorists can be situated 
within the relational egalitarian view that achieving social justice is centrally a matter 
of realising a society whose members can relate to each other as equals (Young 1990, 
Fraser 1996, Anderson 1999, 2014). The central idea is that as moral equals, everyone 
is entitled to an equal basic social standing.   
How might borderline cases of hate speech damage the social standing of certain 
groups? A group’s social standing is a matter of the esteem in which they are held in 
society, and has to do with how they are generally treated and regarded by other 
members in their community, in light of widespread and entrenched attitudes about 
them and their relative worth. For a group to enjoy ‘equal’ social standing roughly 
requires that they generally treated and regarded by others in one’s community in ways 
that affirm their equal worth.  
Now, viewed in isolation, it is unclear how microaggressions might damage the 
social standing of a certain group. First, it is unclear how one instance of being treated 
in a subtly denigrating way in virtue of one’s social identity could damage social 
standing—for example, it is unclear that one instance of asking a British South-Asian 
person, “where are you really from?” is going to damage the social standing of their 
group. Second, in many cases, it is unclear that a microaggression considered in 
isolation even constitutes disrespectful treatment—for instance, telling a black person 
that they are very articulate seems complimentary, and if anything, seems to constitute 
respectful treatment. However, as I suggested above, individual microaggressions are 
instances of pervasive patterns of treatment that marginalised groups are subject to, 
in light of socially entrenched interpretive habits and expectations regarding certain 
groups. Once we situate comments like “you’re so articulate!” addressed to a black 
person in a context where black people are regularly subject to microaggressions that 
communicate the message that they are intellectually inferior, this apparently 
complimentary comment can instead be seen as an instance of a general pattern of 
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treating and regarding black people as intellectual inferiors, or with the expectation 
that they will be intellectually inferior. Further, focusing not only on individual 
microaggressions, but on microaggressions as a form of systematic treatment, allows 
us to make sense of how microaggressions might damage the social standing of target 
groups. For if equal social standing requires being generally treated and regarded by 
others in ways that affirm one’s equal worth, then where social relations are patterned 
by microaggressions that subtly but systematically treat certain groups as inferior, or 
deviants, or outsiders, this seems to deny certain groups the equal social standing they 
are entitled to. 
Now, unlike microaggressions, well-intentioned arguments for certain claims of 
the kind outlined above are not simply manifestations of prevalent attitudes towards 
certain identity groups. Rather they involve claims about certain identity groups that 
appear to be based on evidence and reason. However, I take it the problem with the 
claims made about certain identity groups in ‘well-intentioned arguments’ is that they 
nevertheless seem to be consistent with prevalent attitudes about the lower worth and 
standing of target identity groups relative to others—attitudes that manifest 
themselves in things like microaggressions, and also in more overt forms of identity-
prejudicial discrimination and even violence—such that they effectively provide 
apparent justification for those prevalent attitudes that are partly constitutive of the 
lower social standing of certain groups. For example, a common microaggression 
faced by black people is the assumption of criminality—e.g. white people clutching 
their purses as they pass by, being harassed by campus security when heading to the 
library at night-time, or being followed around by a shop-assistant when shopping—
where the attitude underlying such treatment that associates blackness with criminality 
does not only manifest itself in microaggressions, but also in harsher prison sentences, 
and the disproportionately violent treatment, even murder, of black people at the 
hands of police. ‘Well-intentioned arguments’ such as those made in The Bell Curve—
a book which purports to show that those with lower IQ are more disposed to 
criminal behaviour, and claims that statistical analysis shows that African Americans 
have the lowest IQ amongst all racial groups—provide an apparent justification for 
such prevalent attitudes about the criminality of black people. As such, well-
intentioned seem to be part of a broader narrative that damages the social standing of 
target groups.  
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If borderline cases of hate speech are degrading in the sense that they damage 
the proper social standing of certain identity groups, then it seems that there is 
something morally problematic about such speech such that anger is a fitting response 
to it.  
One problem with this is that anger is often thought to necessarily involve an 
attribution of responsibility or blame to a person for violating some norm. For 
instance, Martha Nussbaum argues that anger has as its target an individual who is 
taken to be accountable for a wrongful damage (2016: 17, 21). On this view, we do 
not simply get angry that some norm has been violated, rather we get angry at those 
who can be faulted for violating some norm. The problem is that when it comes to 
borderline cases of hate speech, anger seems to incorrectly represents the speaker as 
blameworthy, since the speaker did not intend to harm the target group. Indeed, I 
have stipulated that in borderline cases of hate speech, speakers do not intend to harm 
members of the target group. Indeed, those who commit microaggressions and make 
well-intentioned arguments are typically unaware that their speech is harmful. 
Moreover, in cases of microaggression insofar as they often stem from unconscious 
representations, it is unclear that we have the requisite control over them to be 
deemed blameworthy.  
I want to grant that the speaker is typically not blameworthy in cases of 
borderline cases of hate speech. I also want to grant that anger does often involve 
representing an individual as blameworthy for a moral violation, and anger arising 
from borderline cases of hate speech may (incorrectly) represent the speaker as 
blameworthy. However, I also want to suggest that anger can simply represent 
borderline cases of hate speech as moral violations, without involving any attitude 
towards the speaker. In general, it seems anger need not involve representing someone 
as blameworthy. We can get angry about racism, misogyny, capitalism, as structures 
and systems that issue in moral violations. Similarly, borderline cases of hate speech 
seem to constitute a kind of structural harm that we can be angry about. Indeed, if 
anger at borderline cases of hate speech is to be fitting, its proper object is the 
widespread pattern of treatment or regard that the individual microaggression well-
intentioned argument fits into. For it is the pattern not the instance that properly 
damages social standing, and the speaker cannot be held responsible for this. If this is 
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so, it seems safe spaces can be taken to encourage a kind of sensitivity to certain moral 
violations—a disposition to have fitting responses to borderline cases of hate speech. 
Distress becomes understandable as a response to borderline cases of hate 
speech if we consider plausible psychological effects of being systematically mistreated, 
and theorised about in ways that rationalise one’s systematic mistreatment. First, it 
seems natural that such treatment should lead to a low sense of self-esteem or self-
worth. Indeed, this is a documented effect of being subject to microaggressions 
(Torres et al.). Second, the particular features of borderline cases of hate speech may 
lead to anxiety stemming from confusion and self-doubt. In the case of 
microaggressions, these often seem innocuous or minor, and unintentional—this may 
lead one to wonder whether one is over-reacting or whether someone’s comment was 
racially-motivated. In the case of ‘well-intentioned’ arguments, the issue is just that—
one may be upset, but the speaker seems to bear no ill will. One way in which safe 
spaces might mitigate these kinds of distress is by dispelling this confusion and self-
doubt by framing borderline cases of hate speech as harmful. As such, rather than 
encouraging distress by ‘coddling’ students, safe spaces could be seen to encourage 
anger rather than distress at borderline cases of hate speech. If the suggestion that anger 
is a fitting response to borderline cases of hate speech is well-motivated, then it seems 
that safe spaces in fact encourages a fitting sensitivity to certain kinds of speech.  
To situate this back into the context of the ‘bad disposition’ oversensitivity 
critique, it might be asked what the implications are for this critique—is it bad for 
practices in universities to encourage a fitting emotional sensitivity to certain moral 
violations? And if we think of the social role of the university as a place that prepares 
students for public life, is it bad to encourage students to have a fitting emotional 
sensitivity to certain moral violations? It is unclear why this should be a bad thing—
indeed, it seems like a good thing—and I take it that even if it has certain bad 
consequences, there seems to be a genuine question of whether it is fitting anger that 
should be discouraged or whether features of our social world should be changed to 
mitigate these bad consequences.  
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct and respond to the ‘oversensitivity’ 
critique of safe spaces. I have argued that the oversensitivity critique is based on the 
claim that safe spaces restrict speech based on offence and that as such they encourage 
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oversensitivity, understood as a disposition to take offence at borderline cases of hate 
speech where this is inappropriate. Granting that safe spaces restrict speech to protect 
students from offence, I considered the sense in which the offence-taking that safe 
spaces are taken to encourage might be inappropriate. I suggested that for critics, the 
sense in which borderline cases of hate speech are inappropriate is that such a 
disposition has the negative practical consequences for public life, and that this is 
particularly problematic insofar as universities should prepare students for public life. 
I then considered two other non-consequentialist ways of evaluating affective 
responses, suggesting that such responses can be evaluated for fittingness and 
understandability. I argued that offence-taking may be fitting and understandable, and 
indeed, that safe spaces seem to encourage a fitting emotional sensitivity to certain 
moral violations. I ended by suggesting that it should not be problematic for practices 
within the university to encourage a fitting moral sensitivity, and that where such a 
sensitivity has bad consequences for public life, it is not clear that we should 
discourage this sensitivity.  
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Chapter 2: The Epistemic Critique  
 
In this chapter, I will reconstruct and address what I call the ‘epistemic’ critique of 
safe spaces. This critique rests on the idea that the acquisition of truth and knowledge 
is best facilitated by norms of open discussion according to which people ought to 
not only tolerate but actively engage with views opposed to their own. Safe spaces are 
held by critics to violate these norms, insofar as safe spaces shield participants from 
having to engage with certain views opposed to their own. The sting of this critique 
is underscored by the fact that safe spaces operate within the university, an institution 
by its nature dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. I will set aside questions of 
whether there are other competing values that ought to concern students which might 
trump the value of truth-seeking in certain cases, and focus more narrowly on the 
question of whether open discussion norms are better for truth-seeking than the ‘safe’ 
discussion norms encouraged in safe spaces. I will also consider the question of 
whether critics who accept certain kinds of speech restrictions in the university can 
explain what distinguishes the speech restrictions in safe spaces as unacceptable. I will 
argue that open discussion norms have certain epistemic defects in non-ideal 
conditions which safe discussion norms can mitigate, such that safe spaces do not 
necessarily sacrifice epistemic goods by flouting open discussion norms. I will also 
argue that it is unclear that critics have a principled way of distinguishing speech 
restrictions in safe spaces as unacceptable.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. I will begin in §1 with a brief survey of 
claims that are suggestive of the epistemic critique of safe spaces. I will then outline 
Mill’s arguments in favour of open discussion norms, insofar as it is a broadly Millian 
view that seems to underlie critics’ claims. In §2.1-3, I will outline cases where people 
broadly follow open discussion norms, and argue that in such cases, they may lose 
knowledge, or fail to acquire any new knowledge. In §2.1, I will suggest that one may 
acquire misleading testimony from discussing certain issues with others such that one 
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loses knowledge due to loss of justification, and if not, due to loss of confidence. In 
§2.2, I will suggest that being asked for one’s reasons when discussing certain issues 
with others may lead to a loss of knowledge, due to loss of confidence. In §2.3, I will 
suggest that permitting the expression of all viewpoints may prevent the acquisition 
of new knowledge. Then, in §2.4, I suggest how safe discussion norms can act as 
correctives for the epistemic defects of open discussion norms discussed in §2.1-3. In 
§3, I begin by noting that apparently acceptable university practices apply content-
based restrictions and thus flout open discussion norms, thereby undermining the idea 
that universities are—or were, before the advent of safe spaces—bastions of ‘open 
discussion’. I suggest that insofar as critics think certain speech restrictions are 
acceptable in the university, they must explain what makes the speech restrictions in 
safe spaces problematic. In §3.1-2, I consider two such possible explanations: first, 
that the speech exclusions in safe spaces are determined by students and not 
credentialed experts, and second, that safe spaces exclude views on the basis of political 
considerations. I argue that both explanations fail to clearly distinguish what is 
problematic about speech restrictions in safe spaces in particular.  
 
   
§1. Open discussion critics and the Millian background 
Many critics of safe spaces seem to have something like the epistemic critique in the 
background of their worries. For example, in a joint statement published in the wake 
of a speaker being shouted down at a college in the US, Cornel West and Robert P. 
George write: 
The pursuit of knowledge and the maintenance of a free and democratic society 
require the cultivation and practice of the virtues of intellectual humility, 
openness of mind, and, above all, love of truth. These virtues will manifest 
themselves and be strengthened by one’s willingness to listen attentively and 
respectfully to intelligent people who challenge one’s beliefs and who represent 
causes one disagrees with and points of view one does not share. That’s why all 
of us should seek respectfully to engage with people who challenge our views. 
And we should oppose efforts to silence those with whom we disagree—
especially on college and university campuses (West & George 2017). 
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In a similar vein, Joanna Williams claims in her book Academic Freedom in an Age of 
Conformity: 
In today’s marketized and consumer-driven higher education sector, many 
students have come to expect freedom from speech. They argue the university 
campus should be a ‘safe space’, free from emotional harm or potential offence. 
[…] Freedom to propose the outrageous and challenge the ordinary is as essential 
for individual liberty as it is for society’s collective knowledge and understanding 
of the world to advance […] Knowledge must be open for everyone to challenge. 
The advantage of a marketplace of ideas is that the best, least refutable, ideas will 
win out no matter how often they are contested or by whom. The assumption 
that some knowledge is incontestable contributes towards a culture of conformity 
in universities (Williams 2016: 10). 
And in an article for The Spectator, Brendan O’Neill writes: 
 [T]he democratic principle of free and open debate, of allowing differing 
opinions to slog it out in full view of discerning citizens, has been violated, and 
students have been rebranded as fragile creatures, overgrown children who need 
to be guarded against any idea that might prick their souls or challenge their 
prejudices […] The censoriousness has reached its nadir in the rise of the ‘safe 
space’ policy. Loads of student unions have colonised vast swaths of their 
campuses and declared them ‘safe spaces’ — that is, places where no student 
should ever be made to feel threatened, unwelcome or belittled […] This is a 
disaster, for it means our universities are becoming breeding grounds of 
dogmatism. As John Stuart Mill said, if we don’t allow our opinion to be ‘fully, 
frequently, and fearlessly discussed’, then that opinion will be ‘held as a dead 
dogma, not a living truth’ (O’Neill 2014). 
The above quotations have in common the idea that universities should uphold what 
I call ‘norms of open discussion’, namely norms of discussion according to which all 
opinions should be permitted expression and the arguments provided in favour of 
them rationally engaged with, especially where the opinions in question are opposed 
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to one’s own. West and George are explicit that it is important to uphold such norms 
in universities due to their conduciveness to the pursuit of knowledge, while being 
implicitly critical of practices in universities that flout such norms. Meanwhile, 
Williams and O’Neill are explicitly critical of safe spaces as spaces that shield 
participants from engaging with views opposed to their own, while implicitly 
appealing to the idea of a university as an intellectual space within which truth-
conducive norms of open discussion should be upheld. These critics also suggest that 
certain intellectual virtues, such as intellectual humility, are cultivated by an adherence 
to norms of open discussion, and certain intellectual vices, such as intellectual 
conformity and dogmatism, are cultivated by safe space practices. The success of the 
epistemic critique of safe spaces thus seems to turn on whether adhering to norms of 
open discussion and cultivating the attendant intellectual virtues is always better from 
a truth-seeking perspective than adhering to the ‘safe’ discussion norms encouraged 
in safe spaces. 
The epistemic critique seems to draw on broadly Millian considerations in favour of 
norms of open discussion—indeed, the texts from which the above quoted passages 
are excerpted all explicitly reference Mill (O’Neill 2014, Williams 2016, West & 
George 2017). In his famous defence of freedom of speech and discussion, Mill 
appeals not only to epistemological considerations, but also moral and political 
considerations. He first argues that open discussion is valuable as a means to truth 
and knowledge, but goes on to argue that it also facilitates individual flourishing and 
social well-being by enabling individuals to exercise intellectual autonomy and 
cultivate their intellectual capacities, which in turn facilitates social progress. I will 
focus on Mill’s distinctly epistemological arguments in favour of open discussion, 
since critics suggest it is these epistemic considerations that make it such that open 
discussion norms should be upheld by students. Indeed, certain authors who are more 
or less critical of the idea that open discussion norms should apply in wider society 
nevertheless suggest that such norms should apply in the context of academic 
discussions, insofar as they best facilitate the acquisition of knowledge amongst those 
sincerely committed to seeking the truth (see e.g. Marcuse 1965, Haworth 1998, 
Badamchi 2014).  
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Mill argues that open discussion norms are epistemically valuable, first because 
rationally engaging with the arguments of those with whom we disagree compensates 
for our fallibility, helping us to reach the truth; and second, because where we have 
true beliefs, being frequently challenged by the arguments of those with opposing 
opinions ensures that our beliefs are and remain justified. Mill begins by claiming that 
due to the fallibility of human beings, any opinion that we might seek to suppress 
could be true, even if we are certain it is false. As such, he argues that when we 
suppress certain opinions that we deem false, we may be denying ourselves ‘the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth’—we are shielding ourselves from engaging 
with those whose opinions and arguments could compensate for our fallibility by 
providing us with evidence that we may have overlooked, or by exposing mistakes in 
our reasoning (1991: 21, 22, 25). For Mill, to approach the truth, we must guard against 
our fallibility by ensuring we have not failed to appreciate any relevant evidence or 
reasons, and the best way to do this is to engage with the opinions and arguments of 
those who disagree with us. 
Mill recognises that we may have true beliefs without having engaged in open 
discussion—for instance, he suggests the received, popular opinion in a particular 
society may happen to be true (ibid: 40-41). However, Mill thinks open discussion is 
still valuable in such cases, since we cannot have the rational assurance that our beliefs 
are true unless we have sought out challenges and objections wherever possible and 
refuted them. Mill suggests that even if a particular opinion of ours is true, we may be 
unaware of any reasons in favour of holding it until we are forced by opponents to 
defend it and properly consider the reasons in its favour; and even if we do possess 
good reasons for holding a particular (true) opinion, we still lack rational grounds for 
preferring it over opposing views if we have not actively engaged in open discussion, 
since the opposing opinions and arguments we have not considered could prove us 
wrong for all we know (ibid: 41-42). Indeed, Mill suggests that for this reason, we 
cannot properly know the truth unless we have attended impartially to all that can be 
said by those who hold the opposing opinion and refuted their arguments (ibid: 42-
43). Further, Mill argues that even if we do have rational grounds for our beliefs, we 
risk forgetting them if we do not have to make the case for our beliefs and defend 
them against objections in open discussion (ibid: 45). For Mill, without frequent open 
discussion, our opinions will be held as ‘dead dogmas’ rather than ‘living truths’—we 
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will not know the proper grounds of our opinions, and they will fail to properly 
influence our character and conduct (ibid: 40-41). 
 
§2. Problems with open discussion norms 
I want to grant that Millian open discussion norms may be knowledge-conducive in 
suitably ideal conditions. However, in this section, I will look at certain cases that arise 
in non-ideal conditions in order to suggest that in certain non-ideal conditions, an 
adherence to open discussion norms may undermine the pursuit of knowledge. I 
consider three ways in which following open discussion norms is epistemically 
problematic: first, a discussant may lose knowledge due to misleading testimony; 
second, a discussant may lose knowledge when asked for her reasons; and third, 
discussants may fail to acquire new knowledge because they waste time treading over 
basic ground. I then suggest how ‘safe’ discussion norms can mitigate these issues 
with open discussion norms.  
 
§2.1. Misleading Testimony 
Open discussion norms require us to discuss our beliefs with others, whose testimony 
may constitute evidence against our beliefs, or may lead us to lose confidence in our 
beliefs simply as a matter of psychological fact. In this sub-section, I want to focus on 
how others may provide us with misleading testimony such that we lose knowledge. I 
begin with a case in which a subject appears to form a justified belief, and then receives 
misleading testimony. I will first look at how misleading testimony can lead to a loss 
of knowledge insofar as it constitutes evidence that defeats justification. Then I will 
suggest that even if misleading testimony cannot defeat one’s justification in the 
relevant cases, it may lead to a loss of knowledge, insofar as it leads to a loss of 
confidence in one’s belief. Consider the following case: 
Sexual Harassment: Fei is a young graduate student attending a reading retreat 
with various members of her department. At dinner, a middle-aged professor, 
Thomas, sits next to her and strikes up a conversation about a book that a fellow 
student has just presented a paper on. Thomas keeps directing the conversation 
towards sexual themes in the book, which Fei initially thinks nothing of—she is 
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keen to discuss them, and supposes they are both adults. Thomas and Fei are 
deep in conversation after the dining hall has cleared out, and as they talk, Fei 
accepts Thomas’ offers to pour her more glasses of wine. Fei feels Thomas’ foot 
brushing against her leg a few times, but assumes it is unintentional. As the 
conversation draws to a close, however, Thomas starts to stroke Fei’s thigh. 
Disturbed by Thomas’ behaviour and the light it casts on their prior interaction, 
Fei politely excuses herself and joins the others for the rest of the evening. After 
the trip, Fei decides to discuss what happened with Laura, a senior professor in 
her department whom Fei has reason to think has good judgment about these 
matters—Laura has made it clear that she is against discriminatory behaviour, and 
as a woman who has been in the profession for some time, she is likely to have 
had similar experiences. But when Fei tells Laura that she believes she has been 
sexually harassed and recounts the incident, Laura responds that the situation is 
far too ambiguous to call it a case of sexual harassment. She says that Thomas 
probably misinterpreted her behaviour as expressing sexual interest—making the 
advances wanted rather than unwanted—and advises Fei to be clearer about her 
boundaries in future interactions with professors.30  
In this case, Fei forms a justified belief that she was sexually harassed based on her 
moral sensitivity to the situation, and then receives misleading testimony to the effect 
that she wasn’t so harassed from Laura. Now, it is a common view in epistemology is 
that epistemic justification is defeasible by misleading testimony. On this view, S can 
be justified in believing p at time t1, but acquire misleading testimony at time t2 that p 
is false, or that the source of her belief that p is unreliable, such that her justification 
for believing that p is defeated at t2. For instance, let’s say at time t1 Temi forms the 
justified belief that the table before her is blue based on her reliable perceptual 
capacities under normal conditions. At time t2, a reliable and trustworthy informant 
tells her that there is a blue light shining on the table that makes it appear blue. If 
Temi continues believing that the table is blue, her belief seems intuitively unjustified. 
For the informant’s testimony seems to constitute defeating evidence against her 
belief. It is as such that justification is thought to be defeasible by misleading 
testimony.  
                                                          
30 This case is inspired by the ‘Classist College’ case in Srinivasan (m.s.).  
56 
 
If justification can be defeated by misleading testimony, one way in which Fei 
may lose knowledge in Sexual Harassment is by losing justification due to Laura’s 
misleading testimony. Fei has good reason to believe Laura is a reliable judge, and so 
Laura’s testimony seems to provide Fei with defeating evidence that she was not 
sexually harassed. If Fei maintains her belief, this seems to involve dismissing Laura’s 
testimony for no reason. Of course, after the disagreement, Fei may no longer believe 
that Laura is reliable—but having judged her to be reliable prior to the disagreement, 
the fact of their disagreement is not an independent reason to now judge her unreliable 
and therefore dismiss her testimony.31 If, then, Fei loses justification for her belief 
that she was harassed due to Laura’s misleading testimony, she loses knowledge from 
discussing her belief with Laura. As such, following open discussion norms and 
discussing certain issues with others may lead to a loss of knowledge—we may 
encounter those to whom we have reason to defer or to think are as reliable as us, 
who provide us with misleading testimony that defeats our justification.  
It might be argued that the point of open discussion norms is that you are not 
supposed to simply accept others’ testimony, such that the issue of misleading 
testimony is not a problem for open discussion norms. I take it that to say S’s testimony 
provides a reason for me to believe p is to say that the fact that S vouches for the truth 
of p is a reason for me to believe p. This can be distinguished from S’s arguments 
providing reasons for me to believe p, where it is the evidence or reasons S puts 
forward in favour of p that provides me with reasons to believe p (Jones 1999). For 
Mill, the point of open discussion norms is that it allows us to consider others’ 
arguments—indeed, it seems that for Mill, rational discussion with others is conducive 
to knowledge not because their testimony helps us acquire knowledge, but because 
their arguments can provide us with a deeper appreciation the reasons for and against 
certain views. However, it is unclear that discussion norms according to which 
testimony in general is not accepted would not rather undermine the acquisition of 
knowledge, especially when we may not be in a position to appreciate the reasons for 
the belief in question. It might instead be argued, then, that there is something wrong 
with accepting moral testimony. Some authors argue that moral knowledge requires 
grasping reasons due to its connection to moral practice (see e.g. Nickel 2001, Hills 
                                                          
31 For a discussion of the idea that one must have a reason independent of one’s reasoning on the 
matter under dispute to dismiss another’s testimony, see Christensen (2011). 
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2009).32 On this view, we should not accept moral testimony because it does not allow 
us to grasp the reasons for a moral belief. A further possibility is that we lack reason 
to think any particular person is an epistemic peer or expert in the moral domain such 
that moral testimony has no weight. The reason why (non-moral) expert testimony 
defeats justification is because we have reason to believe they are more reliable than 
us—if we do not have reason to think certain people are more reliable than us when 
it comes to moral issues, and we will thus lack reason to give their moral testimony 
any weight.  
There may be other reasons besides to think that misleading testimony does not 
defeat justification in cases like Sexual Harassment. However, even if one thinks that in 
Sexual Harassment, Fei’s justification is not defeated, she may still lose knowledge from 
discussing her belief with others because she loses confidence in her belief as a matter 
of psychological fact. First, to the extent that Fei trusts Laura’s judgment—whether 
or not she has reason to—this puts psychological pressure on her to lose confidence 
in her belief in light of their disagreement. Second, even if Fei maintains her belief in 
the face of Laura’s misleading testimony, if she follows open discussion norms and 
discusses it with others, she is not unlikely to face a significant amount of misleading 
testimony. This is due to many widespread myths surrounding sexual harassment, e.g. 
that ostensibly sexually harassing treatment is invited by the victim’s behaviour such 
that it does not properly constitute harassment; that women commonly lie about 
sexual harassment to advance their own interests such that one should not easily trust 
victims; that victims’ testimony should not be accepted until a court of law has 
determined whether the perpetrator did in fact sexually harass the victim. Fei is thus 
likely to come up against many people who will deny that she was sexually harassed 
or that she is unreliable. It seems plausible that Fei would be likely to lose confidence 
in the face of such systematic misleading testimony. Third, Fei must additionally 
contend with widespread stereotypes about the irrationality and oversensitivity of 
women, which may indeed underlie some of the misleading testimony she receives. 
To the extent that she has internalised these stereotypes, a significant amount of 
misleading testimony is likely to trigger self-doubt. As such, it seems that discussing 
                                                          
32 Hills (2009) thinks that moral knowledge does not require a grasp of reasons, but that we ought 
to seek moral understanding rather than moral knowledge, which does require such a grasp.  
58 
 
certain issues with others can lead to loss of knowledge, if not due to loss of 
justification, then due to loss of confidence.  
 
§2.2 Asking for reasons 
A central feature of open discussion norms is that one should be open to questioning 
about one’s beliefs, and willing to provide reasons for believing them. In this sub-
section, I will first outline a case where a subject appears to form a justified belief, 
then is asked for reasons for her belief. I will suggest that in certain cases, the demand 
to articulate reasons can lead to a loss of knowledge, due to loss of confidence.  
One problem with the demand for reasons is that S may know p without knowing her 
reasons for p. Consider the following case: 
 Sexist Department: Ayesha is a student in the Computer Science department, 
comprised mostly of men. The faculty and other students are generally friendly 
towards her, and have never made any overtly sexist comments around her. There 
are ‘Women in Tech’ posters in the corridors and common rooms, and the 
department organises taster programmes encouraging young women to pursue 
Computer Science. Nevertheless, after some time in the department, Ayesha 
cannot help but feel it is sexist, and eventually decides to discuss the issue with 
her friend and colleague, Ben. Ben is surprised to hear that Ayesha believes the 
department is sexist as he does not share this impression at all, and asks her why 
she thinks this way. But when Ayesha reflects on her experience of the 
department, she realises that she cannot think of any reasons for her belief that 
the department is sexist—indeed, she realises there is evidence to the contrary—
and that she simply has a gut feeling that it is. As such, Ayesha begins to doubt 
her impression of the department, and loses confidence in her belief. However, 
Ayesha and the other women in the department do in fact suffer subtle 
differential treatment by faculty members and other students, due to conscious 
and unconscious beliefs amongst them that women are naturally less competent 
in the subject—they are routinely treated with a presumption of lesser 
competence; when receiving praise, their diligence and team-spirit tend to be 
emphasised, whereas the men tend to be praised for natural aptitude and 
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leadership; they receive less support and encouragement from their supervisors, 
and so on. It was Ayesha’s unconscious sensitivity to this treatment that led to 
her initial belief that her department is sexist.33,34  
In this case, it seems that Ayesha knew that her department was sexist due to her 
unconscious sensitivity to sexist treatment, and lost this knowledge after Ben asked 
her for her reasons, insofar as her inability to provide reasons led to her losing 
confidence in her belief. One way in which asking for reasons can lead to loss of 
knowledge, then, is in cases where discussants know that p but are unable to provide 
reasons, such that they lose confidence in their belief below the threshold required 
for knowledge. Indeed, it seems that open discussion norms require that people lose 
confidence in such cases. For recall that Mill’s argument is that open discussion norms 
are knowledge-conducive because they allow people to know the reasons for their 
beliefs by forcing them to articulate the reasons in favour of their beliefs and rationally 
consider the reasons that others provide for and against their beliefs. The background 
assumption seems to be that if one knows that p, then one should be able to provide 
one’s reasons for believing p. On this view, if one is unable to articulate one’s reasons 
in the face of questioning, then one ought to lose confidence in one’s belief. Where 
open discussion norms are operative, then, the inability to provide reasons puts 
pressure on discussants who have knowledge but do not know their reasons to lose 
confidence in their beliefs. 
The critic might respond that the conception of justification underlying Millian 
open discussion norms—namely that justification requires that you know the reasons 
for your belief—is the correct one, such that the pressure exerted on those who do 
not know their reasons for their beliefs to lose confidence in those beliefs is a rational 
rather than merely psychological pressure. 35  On this view, when Ayesha loses 
confidence in her belief after being asked for her reasons, this is not a case of loss of 
knowledge—she did not know what her reasons for believing her department was 
sexist were, and so cannot be said to have known her department was sexist prior to 
her loss of confidence. To the extent that we are inclined to think that Ayesha did 
                                                          
33 For research on science faculties’ gender biases that favour male students, see Moss-Racusin 
et al. (2012).  
34 This case is inspired by the ‘Racist Dinner Table’ case in Srinivasan (m.s.).  
35 For an example of this kind of conception of justification, see BonJour (1980). 
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know her department was sexist, this conception of knowledge is going to seem too 
strong, but there are other reasons besides to think access to one’s reasons is 
unnecessary for knowledge. A common objection to certain internalist views of 
justification that hold that access to one’s reason is necessary for knowledge is that it 
fails to account for certain intuitive cases of knowledge where it is unclear that the 
subject has access to their reasons—e.g. the knowledge that animals and children 
possess, or perceptual knowledge.  
 It is important to note that to say that S can know p without knowing her reasons 
for believing p is compatible with claiming that S would be in a better epistemic 
position if S did know her reasons. We can distinguish between knowledge and 
understanding in this respect. For example, Ayesha could be said to know that her 
department is sexist due to her unconscious sensitivity to sexist treatment, whilst it 
also being the case that if she also knew her reasons, she would possess understanding 
and be in the epistemically better position of being able to e.g. make accurate 
judgments about similar cases, and achieve greater rational coherence amongst her 
beliefs.  
The critic might accept this characterisation of knowledge, but argue that open 
discussion norms properly aim at understanding, insofar as it is epistemically superior. 
However, I want to suggest that the kind of knowledge that Ayesha possesses may be 
a prerequisite for understanding, such that if open discussion norms lead to a loss of 
knowledge in such cases, they may prevent the attainment of understanding. For 
example, corroboration by those who share similar beliefs may be a prerequisite for 
gaining self-trust and articulating reasons. I have in mind the kind of process of 
coming to understand a previously obscured social experience that Miranda Fricker 
(2007) outlines in her discussion of hermeneutical injustice. Fricker argues that in 
contexts of oppression, certain social experiences of marginalised groups are obscured 
from collective understanding due to the fact that marginalised groups lack the kind 
of social power required to influence collective understanding (2007: 152). In her 
example, one such experience that was once obscured from collective understanding 
was women’s experience of sexual harassment. While women had an inchoate sense 
of their own experience, they did not properly understand their experience due to a lack 
of extant social interpretive resources that would allow them to articulate their reasons. 
It was only when they discussed their experiences with others who shared and 
61 
 
corroborated their sense of their experience that they were able to collectively 
articulate the reasons for their belief, and gain understanding (ibid: 148-151). I take it 
that Ayesha’s predicament is similar to those women who knew but did not 
understand they were sexually harassed. As such, even if the open discussion critic 
holds that it is understanding rather than the kind of knowledge Ayesha has that open 
discussion norms aim to produce, insofar as retaining confidence in that kind of 
knowledge is a prerequisite for understanding, asking for reasons seems undermine 
the attainment of understanding.  
 
§2.3. Obstacles to acquisition of new knowledge 
 
A final problem with open discussion norms is that in requiring people to be open to 
any line of questioning and objections prevents the acquisition of new knowledge. 
Consider the following case: 
Derailing Dave: A group of students come together to discuss the 
marginalisation that black students experience in their university, and more 
generally. Dave, a white man, decides to attend the meeting as he is sincerely 
interested in learning about the different experiences of his fellow students. As 
the discussion gets underway, however, Dave is surprised that the group are 
willing to take for granted what he takes to be highly controversial claims. As 
such, he constantly asks questions and objects that there are various assumptions 
being made that need defending—he asks the other members what reasons they 
have for thinking oppression exists in the face of the equal rights of all, and 
objects that historically disadvantaged groups arguably now have certain 
advantages over heterosexual white men, such as the preferential treatment they 
receive in hiring and university admissions. The group end up spending the 
allotted time in a back and forth with Dave, who fails to find their reasons 
compelling, when they might have acquired new knowledge about the ways in 
which racism functions within universities, and beyond.    
This case straightforwardly illustrates how open discussion norms highly idealise the 
kinds of conditions we are working within when we seek to gain knowledge. If we 
had unlimited time to engage in discussion with others, it would perhaps be 
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acceptable—though still perhaps time-wasting—not to silence certain viewpoints on 
the topic under discussion. For in such circumstances, even if Dave’s contributions 
stall the acquisition of new knowledge, at least Dave has some possibility of gaining 
knowledge too. In real-life circumstances, however, we need to make a judgment 
about whether the possibility that Dave might gain some knowledge should be 
important than the possibility that the group might gain new knowledge. One 
consideration to take into account is the accessibility of the knowledge that Dave is 
demanding from the group. If Dave can easily acquire such knowledge elsewhere—
as he surely can—then it seems particular problematic from a truth-seeking 
perspective for him to demand it in the discussion group. However, if this knowledge 
cannot be easily acquired elsewhere, it still seems unproblematic to not engage with 
every line of questioning or objection. For instance, if a group of theoretical physicists 
are discussing the findings of a particular experiment they have conducted, it seems 
unproblematic for them to silence questions from a curious layperson about the 
various assumptions they are making insofar as this facilitates intellectual progress, 
even if that person cannot easily acquire the relevant knowledge elsewhere. However, 
in both Derailing Dave and the case of the theoretical physicists, open discussion norms 
require that the group engage with those who ask basic questions. As such, another 
way in which open discussion norms are problematic is that they require people to 
trod over basic ground, such that they fail to acquire new knowledge. 
 
§2.4. Safe discussion norms 
 
I have suggested three problems for open discussion norms, namely that misleading 
testimony can lead to loss of knowledge either due to loss of justification or loss of 
confidence, asking for reasons can lead to loss of knowledge due to loss of confidence, 
and being open to all lines of questioning and objections can prevent the acquisition 
of new knowledge. I suggest that safe discussion norms are designed to mitigate these 
issues.  
First, safe spaces exclude viewpoints that they take to underwrite misleading 
testimony that marginalised groups receive in cases like Sexual Harassment to 
counteract the effects that receiving such testimony has on the confidence of those 
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who hold such beliefs. For example, they may silence the false but all-too-common 
view that women are often to at least partially responsible for being sexual harassed 
due to their neglecting to take the appropriate precautions. I take it that safe spaces 
exclude such claims, rather than permitting but disputing them, because where certain 
ideas are socially entrenched and hold sway in the minds of those who have (e.g.) been 
sexually harassed and know that they have, only the unambiguous rejection of such 
viewpoints can ensure that they are not led to doubt themselves, and lose their 
knowledge.  
Second, safe spaces often have rules that one should defer to marginalised 
groups’ testimony about their own experiences, even if one does not share their 
impression of the situation. This is supposed to mitigate the issue of loss of confidence 
in cases like Sexist Department. The idea is that one should not assume that the failure 
of a person to provide reasons in such cases is an indicator that they are not justified 
in their belief. Rather one should recognise that when it comes to marginalised groups’ 
perspectives on their own social experiences, they may know what they experienced, 
despite the fact that they lack the understanding that would allow them to provide 
reasons for their belief.  
Finally, the way in which safe spaces mitigate for the obstacles to acquiring new 
knowledge posed by open discussion norms is straightforward—safe spaces exclude 
discussion of viewpoints they take to be false so that they do not have to constantly 
go over well-trodden ground, and can acquire new knowledge. Examples of such 
excluded views might include: ‘oppression does not exist’, or ‘black people are 
inherently violent’, or ‘women are naturally submissive’.  
 
Of course, the question of whether safe discussion norms are generally more 
knowledge-conducive in certain domains is partly an empirical question. One thing to 
note here is the historical knowledge-conduciveness of feminist consciousness-raising 
groups, which as I suggested in my introductory chapter bear certain similarities to 
safe spaces. The feminist consciousness-raising process is essentially like the process 
that Fricker discusses in relation to women coming to gain understanding about sexual 
harassment. Such practices were crucially important in encouraging women to develop 
intellectual self-trust through having their experiences corroborated by others. 
Moreover, it allowed women to recognise certain similarities in their experiences, and 
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collectively develop concepts that enabled them to and greater understanding about 
certain previously obscured social phenomena, such as sexual harassment and rape 
(MacKinnon 1989, Fricker 2007).  
In any case, my point here is just to push back against the assumption that safe 
discussion norms necessarily sacrifice epistemic goods by flouting open discussion 
norms. While open discussion norms may be knowledge-conducive in ideal 
conditions, safe discussion norms can be seen as an attempt to mitigate certain 
epistemic defects of open discussion norms that obscure certain forms of social 
knowledge under non-ideal conditions.  
 
§3. Open discussion norms and practices in the university 
Another general issue with the notion that open discussion norms should be upheld 
in the university is that it is belied by the actual operation of universities, whose core 
academic practices involve heavy regulation of expression based on content and 
expertise. For instance, those who do not have the relevant qualifications are excluded 
from teaching classes, research papers that flout methodological norms of a discipline 
are excluded from publication in relevant academic journals, and lecturers and 
professors determine course content which students must work within, and which 
students have earned certain disciplinary qualifications (Simpson & Srinivasan, 
forthcoming). Further, certain questions are considered to be settled for the purposes 
of various research projects, e.g. a research team of evolutionary biologists may 
consider it settled that creationism is false, or a team of climate scientists may consider 
it settled that various claims of climate-change deniers are based on fabricated data. 
Thus, the characterisation of safe spaces as being—in their content-based exclusion 
of speech—opposed to the university seems misguided.  
I take it that the safe space critics, as self-declared defenders of the liberal 
university, do not take issue with these sorts of routine practices. Thus, the critics 
must explain why the specific speech exclusions in safe spaces are relevantly different 
to the acceptable restrictions commonly found in universities, such that the former 
but not the latter are problematic. In the following subsections, I consider two 
possible such explanations: first, that the speech exclusions in safe spaces are 
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determined by students and not credentialed experts, and second, that safe spaces 
exclude views on the basis of political considerations.  
 
§3.1. Speech exclusions determined by students, not credentialed experts 
One possible way of distinguishing acceptable speech restrictions in the university 
from speech restrictions in safe spaces stems from a conception of the university as a 
place that is supposed to protect the exercise of disciplinary expertise in the interests 
of producing disciplinary knowledge. On this view, acceptable speech restrictions in 
universities are determined by disciplinary experts who have the relevant expertise or 
authority to determine what kinds of speech should be restricted in the interests of 
producing disciplinary knowledge, whereas the speech restrictions in safe spaces are 
determined by students, who lack the relevant expertise or authority to determine this. 
I will briefly outline Robert Post’s (2013) view to motivate the idea that the acceptable 
speech restrictions in universities are those determined by disciplinary experts. Then, 
appealing to Simpson and Srinivasan’s (forthcoming) discussion of the practice of no-
platforming in universities, I will suggest two lines of response that the safe space 
advocate could provide.  
On Post’s view, the university is not simply an extension of the public sphere, but is 
an institution that exists for the specific purposes of research and teaching—
universities aim to advance the production of disciplinary knowledge, and to convey 
such knowledge to students. Post (2013) argues that the free speech norms that 
properly govern the liberal public sphere are incapable of producing the kind of 
disciplinary knowledge which it is the purpose of universities to produce. The 
production of disciplinary knowledge in universities requires prioritising the speech 
of experts, and granting them the control to enforce disciplinary norms that silence 
certain views, rather than permitting the expression of all views on an equal basis.36 
Indeed, what distinguishes the apparently acceptable exclusions of speech in 
                                                          
36 My focus here is mainly on how content-based restrictions further the research aims of the 
university. However, a focus on the teaching aims of the university may provide some motivation 
for the kinds of speech restrictions safe spaces endorse. If a university’s teaching aims are best 
fulfilled in an atmosphere where students are treated with respect, there may be grounds for 
suppressing speech that demeans and degrades certain groups, such as hate speech or even 
borderline cases of hate speech (as discussed in the previous chapter), insofar as this creates 
conditions under which more productive learning is possible.  
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universities listed above seems to be precisely that they protect such an exercise of 
disciplinary expertise. On this view, one problem with safe spaces as a practice within 
universities might be that they fail to respect the exercise of disciplinary expertise, 
insofar as it is students rather than disciplinary experts that determine the speech 
restrictions in safe spaces. This is because students lack the relevant disciplinary 
expertise to determine the kinds of speech that should excluded in the interests of 
advancing disciplinary knowledge.  
In their paper on the practice of no-platforming in universities, Simpson and 
Srinivasan (forthcoming) suggest two possible lines of response to the criticism: first, 
that the speech restrictions in safe spaces should be acceptable if they are consistent 
with the relevant disciplinary norms—as determined by disciplinary experts—for the 
specific issues under discussion (15-21); and second, that students may have some role 
to play in shaping disciplinary norms (21-22). 
First, if speech restrictions in safe spaces are consistent with the relevant 
disciplinary norms, it seems that such restrictions respect rather than undermine those 
norms, and the authority of the disciplinary experts who determine them. For 
instance, if Holocaust denial is restricted in a safe space, then insofar as Holocaust 
deniers flagrantly flout disciplinary norms that govern historical inquiry, safe spaces 
respect relevant disciplinary standards (Simpson and Srinivasan, forthcoming, 15). 
Similarly, if there is a widespread consensus amongst credentialed experts in sociology 
that institutional racism exists, then in taking this for granted in a safe space, 
participants in safe spaces respect the disciplinary norms of sociological inquiry. As 
such, it does not follow from the fact that the speech restrictions in safe spaces are 
determined by students that they fail to respect the exercise of disciplinary expertise. 
However, there are certain difficulties with determining whether speech 
restrictions in safe spaces are consistent with relevant disciplinary norms. First, it is 
not always clear what the relevant disciplinary norms are for the specific issues under 
discussion in safe spaces. For example, in a discussion about what race is, it is unclear 
whether we should appeal to the disciplinary norms of sociology, anthropology, 
philosophy, history, cultural studies, biology, or something other discipline besides. 
Moreover, even if safe spaces adhere to one set of apparently relevant disciplinary 
norms, it is unclear that this does not fail to respect other disciplinary norms that 
conflict with them (ibid: 20). Further, even if we could determine the relevant 
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disciplinary norms, it is also unclear that there is always going to be broad agreement 
within disciplines about the questions it is acceptable to treat as settled. For example, 
there is intradisciplinary disagreement in gender studies amongst those with 
apparently expert credentials about whether trans women’s status as women is a 
settled question (ibid: 17-18). Now, these difficulties do not show that there is a 
problem with students rather than credentialed experts determining the speech 
restrictions in safe spaces. But it does suggest another explanation for why speech 
restrictions in safe spaces are controversial, namely that it is unclear whether they 
respect the exercise of disciplinary expertise, insofar as there are deep controversies 
surrounding which disciplinary norms should apply, and which norms are 
authoritative where there is intradisciplinary disagreement amongst experts about 
what it is permissible to take for granted (ibid: 21). As such, if one takes a broadly 
Postian view of the university and its aims, the issue with safe spaces is not that 
students determine the speech restrictions, but rather seems to be that it is unclear 
that such restrictions respect the exercise of disciplinary expertise, which is a 
considerably weaker objection.37   
Another line of response is that students can play some legitimate role in 
shaping disciplinary norms. Lecturers and professors may be experts, but it is unclear 
that they should have a monopoly on determining disciplinary norms. First, 
disciplinary experts may be mired in disciplinary orthodoxy, and the perspectives of 
those not so entrenched may provide new, more fruitful approaches. Second, 
disciplinary experts are fairly demographically homogenous particularly in terms of 
class and race, such that more diverse student perspectives can correct for the ways 
in which various disciplinary norms are generally biased towards the perspectives of 
cis, white, heterosexual men. For example, the largely student-led movements to 
decolonise university curricula seem to advance a legitimate critique of certain existing 
disciplinary norms particularly in the humanities and social sciences for (e.g.) their 
exclusion of non-white thinkers and whitewashing of history, and these do not 
primarily come from credentialed experts. 38  The suggestion here is simply that 
students do not seem be excluded in principle from shaping disciplinary norms, such 
                                                          
37 Of course, if it could be shown that safe discussion norms fail to respect any disciplinary norms 
or would not be mandated by any disciplinary experts, then this would be a problem on a Postian 
conception of the university.  
38 See e.g. The Rhodes Must Fall Campaign https://rmfoxford.wordpress.com/about/  
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that the fact that speech restrictions in safe spaces are made by students does not 
necessarily undermine disciplinary integrity.  
 
§3.2. Speech excluded on the basis of political considerations 
A second possible way of distinguishing acceptable speech restrictions in the 
university from speech restrictions in safe spaces is to argue that the former are 
enforced to promote epistemic aims, whereas the latter are enforced purely to 
promote certain political aims, where this may undermine the achievement of certain 
epistemic goods. I take it this is the worry that underlies the claims of certain critics 
that safe spaces encourage ideological conformity and ‘political correctness’ (see e.g. 
Heath 2015, Williams 2016, Bruni 2017). The problem with safe spaces on this view 
is that students should value the pursuit and promotion of knowledge, but are 
forsaking these values by rejecting and suppressing ideas purely on the basis of 
political and not epistemic considerations. In this section, I will consider two 
criticisms: one, that participants in safe spaces disbelieve certain claims on the basis 
of political considerations; and two, that participants in safe spaces suppress certain 
claims on the basis of political considerations. I will suggest that participants in safe 
spaces do not disbelieve certain claims on the basis of political considerations, and 
that in certain cases, it may serve truth-seeking goals to suppress certain true claims.  
A similar criticism to the one I have sketched above is often launched against feminist 
epistemology—as Elizabeth Anderson (2004) summarises: 
Haack says the aim of feminist epistemology is to legitimate the idea that 
“feminist values should determine what theories are accepted” (12). Such 
politicized inquiry leads to “sham reasoners seeking only to make a case for some 
foregone conclusion” (15), and threatens “honest inquiry,” which she 
characterizes as “research not informed by political ideas at all” (16). Koertge says 
feminist epistemologists want “to place ideological constraints on the content of 
science,” (230) raising the specter of Lysenkoism (229). Almeder says that they 
aim “to dogmatize and indoctrinate by eliminating open discussion,” (190) and 
by replacing “traditional canons of evidence and argument” with the test of 
“whether [an idea] furthers the political interest of the oppressed” (193). 
69 
 
For these critics of feminist inquiry, the problem with it is that certain theories or 
claims are accepted or rejected, and promulgated or suppressed, on the basis of 
whether they further or undermine feminist political projects and commitments, 
rather than on the basis of whether they are true or false, or whether this would 
promote the acquisition of knowledge. The criticism as applied to safe spaces is that 
in safe spaces, certain viewpoints are rejected or suppressed on the basis that they 
undermine particular political projects or commitments, rather than on the basis that 
they are false or undermine the acquisition of knowledge.  
It is worth distinguishing between the claim that participants in safe spaces reject 
certain views—that is, disbelieve certain views—on the basis of whether they 
undermine a particular political agenda, and the claim that they suppress certain views 
on the basis of whether they undermine a particular political agenda. I will first 
consider the criticism that participants in safe spaces disbelieve certain claims on the 
basis of political considerations, and then consider the criticism that they suppress 
certain claims merely on the basis of political considerations. 
The first criticism is that participants in safe spaces disbelieve certain claims on the 
basis that they undermine certain political projects they are committed. I take it this is 
epistemically problematic because the fact that an idea undermines a certain political 
project is not a reliable indicator of the falsity of the view. However, it is unclear that 
participants in safe spaces disbelieve certain claims on the basis of political 
considerations. Where they disbelieve the views that are suppressed in a safe space, 
this seems to be because they take them to be false. For instance, participants 
disbelieve claims like ‘oppression does not exist’, ‘trans women are not real women’, 
or ‘that is not a case of sexual harassment’, that are suppressed in safe spaces because 
they think they are false. Indeed, it seems that it is belief in the falsity of the kinds of 
the views safe spaces exclude that largely underwrites participant’s political 
commitments, rather than the other way around.  
I take it the real issue is not so much that participants in safe spaces disbelieve 
certain claims on the basis of political considerations, but that they are not justified in 
disbelieving certain claims that they exclude. What seems to underwrite this issue is 
the idea that if participants were justified in thinking the excluded views were false, 
they would be able to provide reasons for rejecting them to those who would defend 
them. Then, they need not exclude false views, for they ought to be able to provide 
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reasons for rejecting them to dissenters, and then proceed with their discussion. Thus, 
participants in safe spaces may believe that certain claims they suppress are false, but 
the fact that they suppress them suggests they are not justified in believing them false. 
However, as I’ve suggested in §2.2, it seems that people can be justified despite the 
fact they do not know their reasons, such that they will not be able to provide reasons 
to those that disagree with them. Further, people may have reasons for rejecting 
excluded views, but take their falsity for granted for the purposes of making 
intellectual progress and acquiring new knowledge. As such, the fact that participants 
suppress views they believe are false does not mean that they are not justified in 
believing they are false.39  
The second criticism is that safe spaces suppress certain views purely on the basis of 
political considerations. The problem is that safe spaces suppress views, even if they 
might be true, because they undermine certain political aims. Now, I think underlying 
this criticism is a similar idea to the one above. In this case, the underlying idea is that 
safe spaces suppress views because they are not justified in thinking they are false—
and indeed, may therefore accept that the suppressed views may be true—such that 
they must be suppressing them for other reasons, namely because it serves certain 
political aims of theirs to do so. Again, however, just because safe spaces suppress 
certain views, this does not mean participants are not justified in rejecting them. In 
any case, I want to suggest that safe spaces do sometimes suppress true claims, but 
that this need not be epistemically problematic insofar as such suppression can 
promote truth-seeking aims.  
I take it a feminist safe space may suppress claims that patriarchy harms men 
too, or claims that not all men are (e.g.) misogynists. The critic might argue that safe 
spaces suppress such true claims because they undermine feminist political 
commitments and aims—for instance, they might argue that claims that patriarchy 
hurts men are excluded by students even though they are true because they undermine 
the feminist political project as a project focused on eliminating women’s oppression 
under patriarchy. As such, safe spaces suppress truths, and this is epistemically 
                                                          
39 Of course, participants in safe spaces may exclude claims they believe are false, where they lack 
justification for rejecting such claims—I briefly address this worry in the concluding chapter. 
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problematic. In the following, I will suggest that truth-seeking aims may be promoted 
by suppressing true claims in cases where the claims in question derail the discussion. 
Consider claims that patriarchy harms men too in the context of a feminist 
discussion group. It may be true that patriarchy harms men in various ways, but in a 
space devoted to the discussion of women’s experience of oppression and the specific 
issues women face, it derails the discussion to focus on issues that men face. When 
such comments are made in feminist discussion groups, participants are often forced 
to waste time justifying why it is acceptable or more pertinent to focus on women’s 
issues, and are prevented from discussing those issues, and achieving the epistemic 
goods that might be generated by such discussion. Especially where there is a tendency 
for discussions about women’s oppression to be derailed in this way, this is particularly 
problematic from the perspective of acquiring certain forms of social knowledge.40 As 
such, where true claims derail the discussion, it seems to promote knowledge-seeking 
rather than undermine it to suppress them. Indeed, the silencing of true but derailing 
comments seems acceptable in other university spaces for this reason. For example, 
consider a seminar devoted to the discussion of a particular paper. If a participant 
picks up on a minor point raised by the paper, and goes on a tangent about its 
implications for his own research interests, it seems acceptable to interrupt and tell 
him to keep focused on the actual discussion, even if the claims he is making are true, 
or may be worth discussing in other contexts.  
  Of course, the suppression of true but derailing claims do often promote the 
particular political aims of safe spaces. The silencing of true but derailing comments 
can allow participants in safe spaces to gain important social knowledge that can be 
harnessed to further their political aims—e.g. by understanding the ways in which 
patriarchal oppression manifests itself in women’s lives, participants can begin to 
identify ways in which it may be resisted. The fact that they promote political aims, 
however, does not show that they undermine truth-seeking aims. 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct and respond to the ‘epistemic’ critique 
of safe spaces. I have argued that there are certain epistemic defects in open discussion 
                                                          
40 For further discussion of problems with ‘Patriarchy Hurts Men Too’ claims in feminist spaces 
dedicated to discussing women’s issues and experiences, see: 
https://finallyfeminism101.wordpress.com/2007/10/18/phmt-argument/  
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norms in non-ideal conditions which safe discussion norms can be seen to mitigate, 
such that safe discussion norms are not necessarily epistemically problematic for 
flouting open discussion norms. I have also argued that it is unclear there are any 
principled ways of distinguishing those speech restrictions in universities that critics 
find acceptable from the speech restrictions in safe spaces in such a way that the latter 
are problematic but the former are not.   
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to reconstruct and respond to two popular criticisms 
of safe spaces, understood as practices within the university that suppress certain 
kinds of (putatively) oppressive speech.  
In my first chapter, I attempted to reconstruct and respond to the 
‘oversensitivity’ critique of safe spaces. I argued that the oversensitivity critique is 
based on the claim that safe spaces restrict speech based on offence and that as such 
they encourage oversensitivity, understood as a disposition to take offence at 
borderline cases of hate speech where this is inappropriate. Granting that safe spaces 
restrict speech to protect students from offence, I considered the sense in which the 
offence-taking that safe spaces are taken to encourage might be inappropriate. I 
suggested that for critics, the sense in which borderline cases of hate speech are 
inappropriate is that such a disposition has the negative practical consequences for 
public life, and that this is particularly problematic insofar as universities should 
prepare students for public life. I then considered two other non-consequentialist 
ways of evaluating affective responses, suggesting that such responses can be 
evaluated for fittingness and understandability. I argued that offence-taking may be 
fitting and understandable, and indeed, that safe spaces seem to encourage a fitting 
emotional sensitivity to certain moral violations. I ended by suggesting that it should 
not be problematic for practices within the university to encourage a fitting moral 
sensitivity, and that where such a sensitivity has bad consequences for public life, it is 
not clear that we should discourage this sensitivity.  
In my second chapter, I attempted to reconstruct and respond to the ‘epistemic’ 
critique of safe spaces. I argued that there are certain epistemic defects in open 
discussion norms in non-ideal conditions which safe discussion norms can be seen to 
mitigate, such that safe discussion norms are not necessarily epistemically problematic 
for flouting open discussion norms. I also argued that it is unclear there are any 
principled ways of distinguishing those speech restrictions in universities that critics 
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find acceptable from the speech restrictions in safe spaces in such a way that the latter 
are problematic but the former are not.   
 
As I suggested in my introduction, my central aim has just been to push back against 
two popular criticisms launched against safe spaces. These are not the only ones, and 
I think there are other legitimate critiques to be made. 
One example of another popular critique of safe spaces is that safe spaces are 
counterproductive to the aims of activists—the anger they encourage alienates 
potential allies, and shields participants from those they ought to be persuading to join 
them. Of course, it is an empirical question whether safe spaces are counterproductive 
to activist aims. The moral sensitivity to oppressive practices they encourage as well 
as the pertinent social knowledge about oppression they can generate are at least some 
reasons to think they are productive for the aims of activists. Moreover, the view 
underlying the counterproductivity critique that social progress occurs through 
engaging with and persuading those who disagree seems to me widely out of touch 
with reality, though I cannot settle this question here. 
A couple more worries that first that the fact that certain rules are in place in 
safe spaces does not mean that the practice will properly follow those rules. Indeed, 
ambiguities in how to interpret the rules may lead people to manipulate them to 
silence others for their own ends. One worry of this sort is the worry of coption—
conservative students may claim that angry criticisms of their homophobic views 
create an unsafe spaces for them on campus; women who deny patriarchy exists may 
insist that their lived experience be deferred to. Another worry is that even well-
meaning people can make mistakes, excluding views they are not justified in rejecting 
from safe spaces, or excluding speech that turns out not to be harmful. The question 
is whether these flaws are sufficient to outweigh the benefits of safe spaces, and 
whether the principles behind them can be refined so as to better prevent 
manipulation of the rule. In any case, it is worth bearing in mind that safe spaces are 
ultimately experimental practices, and works in progress.  
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